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Japan as China’s ‘Other’: 




Master of Philosophy 
 
This thesis examines contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, in particular the Chinese 
policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands following the end of the Cold War. It 
answers the puzzle of why the territorial dispute emerged as such a divisive issue in 
the bilateral relations between China and Japan. 
 
This thesis embraces a constructivist perspective of international relations and puts 
forward the concept of identity. Identity is understood here as the image of 
individuality and distinctiveness held by a state in international relations and by 
having an identity is to live and act according to the defining features of identity. 
Drawing upon discourse analysis of high politics in China, the thesis maps the 
changes of China’s self-understanding after 1989. Utilizing the Self/Other framework 
it emphasizes the role of Japan as the main Other against which the Chinese identity 
became defined.  
 
The empirical part of the thesis maps the developments in the Chinese policy 
vis-a-vis Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, particularly the meanings attached to the disputed 
islands in China. Applying the Self/Other framework, it demonstrates a strong link 
between representations of China’s identity and policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands. China’s ‘hard-line’ policy vis-a-vis the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands could be 
understood as being driven by its ‘victimized’ identity. A strong response to the 2010 
Incident including a continuous demand for apology, even though it damaged 
economic interests, was justified as in order to prevent further humiliations. 
 
The findings of this research demonstrate that states are social actors, and that 
foreign policies cannot be reduced solely to the rational pursuit of material interests. 
By emphasizing the concept of identity, this thesis contributes to the constructivist 
scholarship in international relations as well as to literatures on territorial disputes 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Relations between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies, are 
important not only for the East Asian region, but also have global repercussions. China and Japan 
historically held very rich and complex relations, which often brought them on a collision course. 
Particularly, the 20
th
 century Japanese imperialism and the atrocities committed by the Imperial 
army have left a profound legacy of both humiliation and resentment in China. During the Cold 
War, China and Japan had initially little contact, but after they normalised relations in 1972, their 
bilateral relations started to improve gradually. Yet, since the end of the Cold War Sino-Japanese 
relations have been deteriorating again and following the 2010 and 2012 diplomatic incidents 
reached the lowest point in decades.  
At the centre of Sino-Japanese troubles has been the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands1 located in the East China Sea. While the islands were of little importance to either 
country during the Cold War, the territorial dispute has emerged as the most divisive issue 
between China and Japan since the 1990s and especially during the 2000s (Downs and Saunders 
1998, Suganuma 2000, Hagstrom 2005, Pan 2007, Wiegand 2009). Incidents, such as the 2010 
boat collision incident and the 2012 landings on the disputed islands led to a deterioration of 
Sino-Japanese relations at both political and societal levels. The gravity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands dispute was acknowledged by the Chinese President Hu who attributed the deterioration 
of Sino-Japanese relations to the developments surrounding the territorial dispute (Xinhua, 
11/9/2012). The recent 2010 and 2012 incidents led to waves of popular interest and outrage in 
both China and Japan (BBC News, 17/9/2012). Demonstrations turned especially violent in 
China, where protesters looted Japanese shops and in their frenzy damaged anything related to 
Japan.  
Perhaps then, it is not a coincidence that the recent public opinion polls in both countries have 
consistently been reporting very negative views and perceptions of each other. A 2012 poll 
reported that 64.5 % of Chinese respondents had an unfavorable view of Japan, while 84.3% of 
Japanese had an unfavorable view of China.2 Political tensions and an atmosphere of distrust 
from the 2000s have  
  
                                                             
 
1 By mentioning the Chinese name first, I am not embracing the Chinese position. I am merely 
approaching the issue from the Chinese perspective.  
2 According to the 2012 joint Genron NPO and China Daily opinion poll, conducted in April and May 
2012 and released on June 20, 2012. Other opinion polls reveal similar results, for a detailed discussion, 
see Wu (2012). 
2 
 
surfaced even despite deepening economic and cultural interconnectedness between the China 
and Japan (Chen 2011, The Wall Street Journal, 17/9/2012). The dictum ‘economics hot and 
politics cold‘ (zhengleng jingre), which is often invoked to characterize Sino-Japanese relations 
has never been more true than now.  
 
1.1 Preliminary literature review 
Scholars have attributed the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations to a variety of factors such 
as the structural changes of the international system after the Cold War, domestic politics in 
China and Japan and a legacy of unresolved historical controversies. Betts (1993), Friedberg 
(1993) and Christensen (1999) emphasized the shifting balance of power in East Asia and 
expressed worries about the negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations. They argued that the rise 
of China and the stagnation of Japan will bring the two countries on a collision course and likely 
drag in the United States as well. Other scholars highlighted the importance of ideational factors; 
Whiting’s pioneering study emphasized the importance of perceptions and misperceptions in 
Sino-Japanese relations and argued that Chinese images were based on bitter memories of the 
past humiliations (Whiting 1989). More recently, scholars have blamed rising nationalisms, 
disputed histories and conflictual identities for the downturns in Sino-Japanese relations (Gries 
2004, Chan and Bridges 2006, Hughes 2008).  
 
While scholars acknowledged the significance of China’s national identity in impacting 
Sino-Japanese relations, in particular the changing of China’s identity as oppositional to Japan,; 
nevertheless they mostly reduced it to regime propaganda (Zhao 2004, Shirk 2007). Denied 
agency and inconsequential for foreign policy analysis, identity was only mentioned in passing 
alongside nationalism in the studies of Sino-Japanese relations, without further elaborations.  
 
Similar arguments have been invoked with respect to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute 
(Downs and Saunders 1998, Deans 2000); the change of Chinese identities was considered 
merely a by-product of legitimating efforts by the governments in China and Japan or a strategic 
tool in political struggles in both countries. Shirk argued that Japan- related issues were abused 




support as well as to divert attention from sensitive domestic issues, such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands dispute; nevertheless, when anti-Japan protests spun out of control, they were halted 
immediately (Shirk 2007). In line with the general dominance of realist thinking in International 
Relations (IR), identities and identity politics are presented as merely derivative of power politics 
and are denied analytical primacy. While the reasoning behind these arguments is not necessarily 
wrong, it presents only a simplistic picture of Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
As identity is difficult to grasp analytically, there are only a few International relations studies 
which pay exclusive attention to identity in explaining Sino-Japanese relations or China’s 
Japan-policy making (Shih 1995, Callahan 2004, Suzuki 2007). Nevertheless, there are no studies 
which analyse the developments from 2000 in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute, or pay 
specific attention to the 2010 boat collision incident, through the identity perspective. Likewise, 
there are no studies explicitly linking the changes in China’s identity since 1989 and their impact 
on China’s policy vis-a-vis Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  
 
1.2 Theoretical conceptualisations 
In this research, for the purposes of analytical clarity, I initially embrace a minimalist definition 
of identity as “the image of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an 
actor” (Jepperson et. al 1996: 56). To have an identity is therefore to live and act according to a 
set of rules and principles. In international relations, identity defines the borders of appropriate 
and legitimate state behaviour, which must be consistent with the particular articulations of 
identity. As identity is inherently a constructivist concept, I place my framework in the 
constructivist camp of International Relations. By constructivism is meant the constructivist 
ontology and epistemology, which emphasizes the socially constructed nature of international 
politics, rather than a (grand)theory of international relations (Guzzini 2000). This 
meta-theoretical step enables an analysis of developments in Sino-Japanese relations and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute not as pre-given or pre-determined but constructed by actors and 
their own interpretations. As opposed to realism and its ontology, constructivism argues against 
the presumed uniformity of nation-states, which opens up the door for understanding of the rich 




factors in Sino-Japanese relations, such as memory, history and identity, which shape domestic 
and international politics of China. 
 
By placing my approach in the constructivist camp, I am not interested in proving or disproving 
the superiority of a particular International Relations approach. Rather, the aim is to use 
constructivism to provide an alternative reading of Sino-Japanese and the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands dispute and particularly the 2010 incident. This approach certainly neither has the 
ambition to explain all aspects of the Sino-Japanese relations or the territorial dispute, nor to join 
the animated debate on the merits of various IR theories. Rather, the identity perspective 
anchored in constructivism will be utilized as it is very well-suited to account for the evolution 
and the scope of the Chinese policy vis-a-vis the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands after 1989.  
 
1.3 Research Questions and Study Scope 
This thesis examines Sino-Japanese relations and particularly the China’s policy towards the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands since 1989. This research resolves around the central research question: 
‘how can we account for China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands after 1989?’ 
Connected to the central question are the supplementary ones, which help to answer the central 
question. The supplementary research questions are: ‘why did the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
dispute become such a heated issue in the Sino-Japanese relations?; ‘how did China’s post-1989 
identity crisis impact its relations with Japan?’; ‘how can we account for China’s handling of the 
2010 boat collision incident?’; ‘and finally, ‘how can China and Japan improve their strained 
relations?’. In the following chapters, all of these questions will be addressed and then briefly 
revisited in the conclusion.  
 
Although, my research interest spatially lies in the Sino-Japanese relations, my analysis is limited 
to China and China’s position to the relationship. I do not wish to discard Japan altogether from 
my analysis, as it has been an important referent, or the ‘Other’, against which the Chinese 
identity has been increasingly (re)defined. Nevertheless, I shall rather limit my attention to the 
processes of Chinese identity and foreign policy formation and so do not examine Japan’s 




evolution of the framing of Japan as well as the dispute within China, and how the dispute, and 
particularly the 2010 incident has been constructed in China in the official and semi-official 
political discourse. This thesis therefore focuses predominantly on state elites, as the principal 
agents who are in the end responsible for the foreign policy decision-making.  
 
Temporally, I focus on the developments in the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute since the end 
of the Cold War, but particularly on the recent 2010 boat collision incident. Since 1989, despite a 
continuous growth of economic exchanges between China and Japan, overall Sino-Japanese 
relations and the tensions related to the dispute have continued to deteriorate. During this period, 
Chinese elites tried to renegotiate China’s identity by presenting a different understanding of 
China and Japan. Japan was transformed into China’s Other, which was achieved by making 
negative comparisons to Japan, against which Chinese identities were renegotiated. Moreover, 
Japanese actions only confirmed this negative characterisation of Japan within China. China has 
are very sensitive towards what it sees as repeated Japanese aggression. A Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs official during the 2010 incident stated that “the Japanese government has 
repeatedly stirred up troubles in recent years on the issue of the Diaoyu Island” (Xinhua, 
10/9/92010). 
 
The 2010 boat collision incident was the most serious development in Sino-Japanese relations 
since the Koizumi era and therefore warrants scholarly attention. At the same time the territorial 
dispute intensified and the Sino-Japanese relations have sunk to the lowest level since 
normalisation. In general it is important to examine China’s policy towards Daioyu/Senkaku 
islands as it takes place in the context of increasing media attention to the ‘rise of China’.  
 
The importance of this study of Sino-Japanese relations and the territorial dispute is two-fold. 
Firstly, I aim to demonstrate that identities matter particularly in China’s relations with Japan and 
in the construction of China’s foreign policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. While 
constructivism and identity perspective has been applied to European and United States politics, 
there are relatively few constructivist accounts of Sino-Japanese relations and none of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute available in English. Secondly, there is very little academic 





to the scholarship on the subject. 
 
Secondly, not only as an academic exercise, this thesis attempts to sketch possible avenues for 
Sino-Japanese reconciliation based on identity change. While there is a plethora of voices about 
the coming conflict between China and Japan, it is necessary from the ethical perspective to 
outline ways in which China and Japan could not only solve the territorial dispute but also mend 
their strained relations. Moreover, insights from this study on how to reach reconciliation might 
also be applied to other strained bilateral relations, such as Korean-Japanese, Sino-American 
relations or other territorial disputes or enduring rivalries.  
 
1.4 Research design 
This research primarily utilizes primarily qualitative methodology. I employ different research 
tools, but these should be seen as complementary and not as oppositional. To examine China’s 
identity I predominantly utilize content analysis of academic literatures written by both Chinese 
and Western scholars. I also rely on discourse analysis of various official and semi-official texts, 
both oral speeches and written documents. Therefore, policy statements, defence and diplomatic 
white papers, newspaper articles, and speeches of political leaders will be analysed. While 
identity cannot be by itself readily observed, examinations of sources at the elite level are crucial 
for uncovering the discursive construction of identities in China. Due to my limited knowledge of 
Chinese language, I have to rely on English translations of the above-mentioned documents. 
Fortunately, there is an abundance of official Chinese documents available also in the English 
language. Unfortunately, not so many documents or materials at the popular level are available; 
hence I would have to limit my attention to the elite level. I am keenly aware that the quality of 
discourse analysis depends on the interpretive skills of the scholars, and therefore relying on 
English translations rather than on original texts in Chinese is a limitation of my research 
endeavour.  
 
I also utilize large-scale surveys by various organisations to corroborate my arguments, which 
have the advantage of relatively precisely capturing public opinion on a particular topic. Surveys 
have the advantage of tapping directly into the content of identity, which makes them useful for 




applied to the mass-level and complement the discourse analysis approach, which is aimed 
predominantly at the elite level.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 firstly reviews International Relations 
approaches to the study of Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. The 
chapter also introduces and discusses in depth the concept of identity and how it can help us 
understand international politics and China’s policies towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands since 
1989. The following chapters further develop theoretical themes introduced in chapter 2; the 
analytical efforts culminate in chapter 5 which would offer an alternative reading of China’s 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands policy. Therefore, chapter 3 discusses historical events that came to the 
forefront of China’s understanding of Japan following 1989. The Opium Wars and, particularly, 
the Sino-Japanese Wars will be discussed as their symbolic power increased and became the raw 
material for China’s post-Cold War identity. Chapter 4 discusses in detail changes in Chinese 
self-understanding after the Cold War, emergence of new security narrative that emphasizes 
China’s victimisation and humiliation by and the negative role Japan played in this construction. 
With the weakening of China’s socialist identity and the imminent identity crisis, China’s identity 
became more exclusive and Japan was rendered the main ‘Other’ in China’s identity construction. 
Chapter 5 applies the identity perspective to contemporary Sino-Japanese relations and China’s 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands policy. Building upon the previous chapters, this analytical chapter 
firstly appraises the symbolic importance of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and its role in China’s 
identity discourse. Utilizing an analytical framework developed in chapter 2, this chapter 
demonstrates the impact of China’s ‘victimized’ identity on its response and handling of the 2010 
boat collision incident. Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of the thesis, and 
suggests ways for possible Sino-Japanese reconciliation based on identity change.  
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Chapter 2: Sino-Japanese relations and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute in the 
International Relations scholarship 
2.1 Competing theoretical perspectives 
Given the importance of the Sino-Japanese relations, there is abundant International Relations 
scholarship covering its various political, economic and socio-cultural aspects. This chapter has 
two goals; firstly to discuss how different international relations theories approach and analyse 
Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. Secondly, to introduce and discuss in 
depth the concept of identity and its importance for the study of international relations and 
foreign policy. I emphasize the central questions relating to identity: its formation, stability and 
change, methodological challenges and its impact on foreign policy. The comprehensive 
theoretical discussion is essential in order to prepare ground for an alternative empirical reading 
of Sino- Japanese relations and China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  
 
2.1.1 Neorealism and Sino-Japanese relations 
Neorealism offers a top-down perspective of international relations that emphasizes the impact of 
the structure of the international system on state identities, interests and behaviour (Waltz 1979). 
Realists argue that in the anarchical international system, devoid of central authority (also known 
as anarchy), states need to primarily guarantee their survival, which makes them very sensitive to 
global distribution of power. Therefore, the nature of the international system leads states to fear 
each other, makes state survival a priority and forces states to maximize their power at the 
expense of other states.3 International politics is thus a ‘zero sum game’ in which conflict is an 
endemic part; cooperation is challenging due to relative gains concerns as well as a fear of 
cheating (Mearsheimer 1994).  
 
Sino-Japanese relations 
Realist scholars have been characteristically pessimistic about the future of Sino-Japanese 
relations. They consider systemic conditions condusive to instability  
  
                                                             
 
3 Classical realists emphasized the importance of domestic and ideational factors; nevertheless, after the 
behavioral and systemic turn in International Relations, realists have been largely ignoring domestic 
factors.   
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between China and Japan: according to the Power Transition Theory, the probability of war 
increases as the rising and the incumbent power are near the point of power transition between 
them. On the one hand, China’s relative economic and military power has been increasing and in 
2010 surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy. On the other hand, Japan’s relative 
power after two decades of economic and political stagnation has decreased. The Economist 
estimated that China would be able to maintain the 2000s decade increases of about 12% in 
military spending a year in the coming years as well (The Economist, 7/4/2012). The recent 
inauguration of an aircraft carrier and an active stealth fighter jet programme testify to the 
technology advancements of Chinese military.  
 
Secondly, Sino-Japanese relations take place in the context of the volatile East Asian region, 
which has since the end of Cold War suffered from a balance of power shift, a lack of security 
institutions and a host of unresolved territorial disputes. Realists therefore concluded that East 
Asia was “ripe for rivalry” (Friedberg 1993) and would “replace Europe as a major source of 
instability in the 21
st
 century” (Christensen 1999).As a consequence of these developments, Sino 
Japanese relations will enter an era of ‘simmering rivalry’ (Calder 2006) due to the Chinese 
revisionism vis-a-vis the international system and so the probability of conflict with Japan will 
increase.4  
 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute 
From the realist perspective, China and Japan have competing national interests and therefore 
both show an interest in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The isles are not only strategically located 
between the Chinese mainland and the Japanese Okinawan island chain, but also their adjacent 
waters are tipped to contain abundant hydrocarbon resources and rich fisheries. 5  As a 
consequence of its economic growth, China has become more dependent on oil and gas, which it 
strives to secure even at the expense of tensions in foreign relations (Dannreuther 2003, Liao 
2008). Therefore, China and Japan will inevitably clash over the disputed islands, which would 
further aggravate the security dilemma. In the atmosphere of mutual suspicion, both countries try 
to improve their material security at the expense of each other. In  
  
                                                             
 
4 Nevertheless, there are historical anomalies to states expanding their foreign policies once power 
increases. Qing China did not change its isolationist foreign policies even following the Western 
imperialist pressure. Likewise, China was most revisionist when China was weakest, right after the 
establishment of the PRC. (Legro 2007:519). 
5 Oil was originally discovered in 1968 by a UN mission.  
10 
 
the realist analysis, identities or nationalisms are a function of the distribution of power and 
merely an instrument of elites in both countries where rational leaders manipulate citizens 
through government propaganda (Deans 2000). History is a toolkit which can be exploited by 
political leaders in China in order to gain concessions from Japan and as well to strengthen 
domestic legitimacy. Downs and Saunders argued that Chinese leaders since 1989 have been 
trying to hold the delicate balance in the relationship with Japan on the one hand by paying lip 
service to nationalistic rhetoric, but in the end always championing restraint and economic 
cooperation with Japan (Downs and Saunders 1998, Shirk 2007). In Downs and Saunders’ 
account Chinese political leaders are merely self-interested rational actors who “make tactical 
shifts between the two sources of legitimacy to maintain their rule, waiting until the country 
becomes powerful enough to achieve their nationalist objectives” (Downs and Saunders 1998: 
122). 
 
2.1.2 Neoliberalism and Sino-Japanese relations 
As opposed to realism, liberalism provided a more optimistic vision of international politics and 
argued that peaceful relations among states are possible. While sharing many of the realists’ 
worries, liberals, nevertheless, argue that even under the conditions of anarchy states prefer to 
pursue economic cooperation instead of competition. International trade mitigates inter-state 
conflict, as economic interdependence discourages states from waging war against each other. 
Secondly, international institutions can influence the behaviour of states and motivate 
cooperation by reducing the costs of transactions (Walt 1998:31). Therefore, China’s material 
improvement will empower those domestic forces in support of integration into the international 
system and peaceful relations with neighbouring countries. The growth of the middle class in 
China therefore plays a dual role of domestically pushing for further liberalisation and eventually 
perhaps even democratisation while internationally China would gradually adjust its foreign 
policy options and interests to be consistent with other powers in the international system.  
 
Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute 
From the liberal perspective, economic cooperation has played a decisively stabilizing role in 




been growing steadily and in 2011 reached a bilateral total of $345 billion, which represents 9% 
of China’s overall trade (The Wall Street Journal 17/9/2012). Even if the common membership in 
various international organisations has not had yet the desired effect, bilateral trade and economic 
interdependence can be credited for smoothing the sometimes rocky political relations. As 
recently China replaced the United States as Japan’s leading trade partner and likewise Japanese 
investments in China have been growing, this increasing economic interdependence will play 
also a decisive role in the future and will help China and Japan manage their relations. According 
to Berger, China’s growing reliance on world markets has increased the costs of any military 
conflict considerably, and secondly it strengthens the domestic position of groups that favour 
deepening economic cooperation between China and Japan (Berger 2000:417). Likewise, Koo 
has argued that the growing economic interdependence between China and Japan has helped 
many times to mitigate the escalations over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. China and 
Japan chose to contain domestic nationalisms and have according to Koo refrained from 
resolving the dispute aggressively but rather focused on lucrative economic cooperation and 
overreaching common economic interests (Koo 2009).  
 
2.2 Studying Sino-Japanese relations: Beyond rationalism 
Despite significant differences over the extent to which institutions can lessen the effects of 
international anarchy, or whether states pursue absolute or relative gains, realism and liberalism 
fundamentally “share the same view of the world (ontology) and, crucially, the same view of 
what counts as reliable knowledge about that world (epistemology)” Smith (2002: 380). For 
realists and liberals, international politics is a game of utility maximization, which manifests 
itself in interstate conflict or cooperation; as interests determine actor behavior, the point of 
contention is merely whether these interests are internally or structurally determined 
(Bukovansky 1997).  Moreover, both paradigms share a fundamental ontological assumption 
that social reality exists independently detached from actors’ subjectivity, as well as a 
neo-positivist epistemic stance that reality could be in turn studied scientifically and reproduced 
as neutral truth in scholarship. 
 
Neither neorealists nor neoliberals consider identities seriously; identity is reduced to dependent 




behavior. Their joint commitment to rationalism effectively closes the door to a richer 
understanding of international politics, and effectively limits the area of scholarly engagement. 
As Hall put it “theories of rational choice tend attempt to avoid the problem of self-understanding 
of national agents with the assumption that they are rational actors impelled to action by 
instrumental rationality and systemic forces” (Hall 1999:27). As a consequence, considerable sets 
of social and economic questions other than interstate war or economic cooperation are ignored 
in IR scholarship. 
 
Security policies among states as well as in Sino-Japanese relations do not derive merely from 
material conditions and are often far more complex than suggested by the rationalist model of 
international politics (Suzuki 2007). As Jager argued “the main sources of regional instability and 
potential conflict in East Asia are thus those which, ironically, international relations theorists 
paid the least attention to … namely, issues of memory, identity, and nationalism”(Jager 2007: 6). 
Self-understandings based on shared ethnicity, language, history and belief produce state 
behaviours that cannot be explained solely by the prescription of rational action. International 
relations scholars need to pay attention to the impact of historical representations on how states 
define their relationships with friends and enemies. Likewise, they need to be sensitive to how 
historical memory deeply embedded in national identities shapes the definition of state interests, 
which has been largely absent in international relations analyses. Therefore, an identity 
perspective to international relations can illuminate an understanding of China’s unique policy 
problems with Japan and could transcend ‘irrational’ behaviour towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands dispute framework.6  
 
2.2.1 Constructivism 
Whereas neorealism and neoliberalism focus predominantly on material forces, such as military 
power or trade, constructivism emphasizes the impact of ideas on international politics, 
particularly how actors, via their actions, construct the world they live in (Onuf 1989, Wendt 
1999). Three elements make constructivism a distinct  
  
                                                             
 
6 China managed to resolve its territorial disputes with Russia, and still has an unresolved dispute with 
India, yet these have neither harmed the bilateral relationship nor have they provoked a heated response 
from the public. 
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form of theorizing: firstly, world politics is guided by intersubjective ideas; secondly, state 
interests and identities are not constant but amenable to change; and finally, structures and agents 
constitute and determine each other (Copeland 2000).7 In the 1990s constructivism gained 
prominence mainly through the critique of International Relations orthodoxies, such as the realist 
notions of interests and security. Perhaps the best known example is Alexander Wendt and his 
thesis ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). Constructivists advanced an original 
research programme, which spawned significant advances on the nature and meanings of anarchy, 
identities and interests of states, as well as change in world politics (Hopf 1998). Constructivist 
scholars embraced ‘cultural’ variables previously marginalized in the discipline, such as ideas, 
epistemic communities, strategic culture, and norms (Klotz and Lynch 2007).  
 
As opposed to rationalists who understand behavior as driven by situation or conditions, 
constructivists on the other hand view foreign policy as a creative and novel action which stems 
from the actor’s interpretations of the world (Bukh 2010). Methodologically, constructivism does 
not follow the rationalist order of research, such as starting with a theory, inferring generalizable 
causal claims from it, and testing them against empirical cases. Instead constructivists work 
‘upwards’ from details of specific cases to theoretical claims that capture the patterns and 
relations between them (Dessler and Owen 2005). Nevertheless, constructivism is not a coherent 
school but an umbrella of different research strategies utilizing divergent methodologies, working 
on both the domestic (Berger 1993, Hopf 2002) and the systemic level (Wendt 1994).8  
 
One of the key contributions of constructivism lies in its elaboration of security interests and 
behaviour. Traditionally in security studies, states were conceptualized as securing their interest 
against objective and external threats. Particularly during the Cold War security literature took 
state interests for granted, where interests are merely ‘out there’ waiting to be ‘discovered’ by 
rational and self-interested actors. However, constructivism examines not only the state behavior 
but also emphasizes the meanings attached to power and state interests, especially how states 
came to define their interests in the first place. Constructivists pay close attention to the  
  
                                                             
 
7 Wendt’s definition is slightly different. See Wendt (1995). 
8 For a review, see Price and Reus-Smit (1998), or Rumelili (2004). 
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discursive and social practices that define the identities of actors and the normative order within 
which they behave. Focusing on material interests exclusively is insufficient to determine state 
behaviour; rather, “security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in 
relation to the conceived identity of others” (Katzenstein 1996: 60). Therefore, with its emphasis 
the ‘constitutiveness’ of the actors and structures, constructivism is well equipped to develop a 
theory of international politics that would utilize analytically the concept of identity and apply it 
to foreign policy analysis (Epstein 2011: 3-4). 
 
2.3 Identity in International Relations 
If the ‘constructivist turn’ in International Relations spawned a new research agenda, then 
identity is undoubtedly its most successful child. Identity, in the words of Lapid, made “a 
dramatic comeback in social theory and practice at the end of the twentieth century” (Lapid 1996: 
3). While the concept of identity was originally developed in psychology and sociology, it was 
picked up by International Relations scholars looking for alternatives to the realist-rationalist 
vocabulary (Berenskoetter 2010). While many of the phenomena now associated with identity 
were discussed by the first generation of International Relations scholars, such as Carr, Deutsch, 
and Morgenthau, identity faded into obscurity during the Cold War and was marginalized in the 
discipline dominated by Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. Nevertheless, the ideational 
explanations of international politics rose to prominence again following the end of Cold War, 
after the emergence of new conflicts, such as in Yugoslavia, made it clear that state action could 
not always be reduced to rational action or power maximization. The identity perspective was 
applied to account for Sweden’s intervention in the Thirty Years War (Ringmar 1996), American 
construction of the Cuban missile crises (Weldes 1996), or Japan’s choice to send troops to Iraq 
after the American invasion in 2003 (Catalinac 2007). 
 
Identity carries a particular promise for the understanding of Sino-Japanese relations and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. Hate, shame, revenge, humiliation and negative mutual 
perceptions are often invoked to account for the level of mistrust and hostilities between China 




under-theorized in the discipline of International Relations,9 they are mentioned only in passing 
and anecdotally in an analysis of Sino-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, constructivism with its 
emphasis on the mutual constitution of the agents has promise to account for the complex 
relationship between national identity deeply embedded in the historical memory, and the 
definition of state interests and state action. Moreover, by engaging with the concept of identity 
we can overcome the difficulties of applying theories based exclusively on the Western 
experience to the study of Asia (Kang 2003). By emphasizing contingency, constructivist as 
opposed to rationalist approaches show sensitivity towards China’s future, which is very difficult 
to envision, much less predict as the linear realist and liberal models do (Legro 2007). Therefore, 
identity has the promise to account for how historical representations and perceptions in 
Sino-Japanese relations influence how China defines and executes its policies towards Japan and 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.10 
 
Once the concept of identity came into prominence in International Relations, it was utilized in 
an eclectic way by scholars operating on different levels of analysis. Despite a steady growth of 
identity scholarship in the 1990s and 2000s, there was no consensus on how to grasp the concept 
analytically; identity was used loosely, and remained vague and understudied. Even sympathetic 
scholars, while calling identity the “conceptual shooting star in the International Relations 
scholarship since the 1990s”, lamented the lack of rigorous analytical attention the concept itself 
received (Berenskoetter 2010: 3595). The conceptual ambiguity invited sceptics who questioned 
the analytical usefulness of identity. In an influential critique, Brubaker and Cooper accused 
identity of either “being too much, or too little, or nothing at all” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 1). 
Most importantly, Brubaker and Cooper castigated a lack of analytical clarity in identity 
theorizing and maintained that its eclectic use made identity ‘hopelessly ambiguous’ (Ibid. 6).  
 
Nevertheless, even though identity is a much ‘looser’ analytical concept that escapes the narrow 
positivist terminology, we do not necessarily have to follow Brubaker and Cooper’s suggestions 
of abandoning identity altogether, as they have certainly raised  
  
                                                             
 
9 For a rare account, see Harkavy (2000). 
10 This claim does not presuppose that every policy China undertakes towards Japan could be explained 
through the identity lens. The effect of identity in every case has to be empirically established. If a 
strong and convincing link between identity and foreign policy cannot be made, then indeed identity has 
little explanatory value.  
16 
 
important questions for any scholar wishing to use identity analytically in international politics. 
The fact that identity is an inherently unclear and contested concept should not prevent us from 
trying to apply it to international relations and foreign policy analysis; however, it must be 
conceptualized in a meaningful fashion first.11  
 
Therefore, the following paragraphs deal with the various aspects of identity, such as its 
construction, endurance and effect on foreign policy. The extended theoretical discussion is 
necessary to make sense of identity conceptually and analytically as well as to prepare the ground 
for further analysis of Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute in the 
following chapters.  
 
2.3.1 The constitutive dimensions of identity 
What is identity? Is it an ideology, a social movement or just a shared understanding? Can we try 
to define identity analytically or shall we rather think of identity as a series of descriptions? 
Dittmer and Kim in their influential volume on China’s collective identities offered a 
metaphorical description of identity, as an on-going journey, or as a relationship, instead of a 
static description (Dittmer and Kim 1993). Nevertheless, as there is no consensus on a single 
definition of identity, it is useful to start with a minimalist definition of identity offered by 
Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt “as the image of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) 
held and projected by an actor” (Jepperson et. al 1996: 56). For example, I am a professor, a 
Hong Konger, etc. Therefore, to have a social identity means to live and act under a set of 
descriptions; identity helps to make sense of myself and also others (Diez 2004). 
 
In international politics an identity takes the form of a predominant set of ideas and images about 
what a state as well as other states are and should be, and guides the relationship with other states. 
On the inside of the state, identity pertains to language, ethnicity, and religion together with 
traditions and collective memory, which allows nation to remain relatively stable over time, and 
is sometimes referred to as national identity. One scholar offered a definition of state identity as a 
“set of broadly accepted representations of a country’s cultural and societal beliefs about its own  
  
                                                             
 
11 After all, other dominant concepts in the discipline, such as power, interest or state, are likewise 
vague and can have multiple meanings!  
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orientation in the international political area, as manifested by the rhetoric of official policy, 
academia and popular culture” (Morris 2012: 137). 
 
As a measure of its strength, individuals would come to the defence of the collective identity, 
which they see as fundamentally constitutive of their selves, when they feel it was threatened. In 
the international realm, a state would act in a way that is consistent with its identity. If state 
behaviour is inconsistent with a particular identity and there is little domestic opposition, then 
indeed the effects of the identity has little or no effect on the state foreign behaviour. Therefore, 
state identity could be conceptualized as shaping the boundaries of acceptable and legitimate 
behaviour in international politics, which could be understood as an international performance of 
the state identity.12  
 
2.3.2 The role of difference in identity construction 
Identity is an inherently social concept; it involves an internal (Self) and an external dimension 
(Other), with internal coherence and external distinctiveness. Nevertheless, scholars disagree 
over the importance of difference in identity construction. Wendt and the ‘conventional 
constructivists’ consider identities pre-social and ontologically prior to international system and 
based on the domestic self- organising properties. In other words, states have a fairly stable sense 
of self before they interact with other states. On the other hand, ‘critical constructivists’13 
emphasized the importance of difference discovered in the others contributing to the identity 
construction (Campbell 1998, Pan 2004). They argued that identities are always constructed 
against a difference and are based on mutual exclusion and the representation of the ‘Other’ as a 
threat to one’s identity.14 As elaborated in the following section, these differences are then 
translated into representations of dangers that could lead to collective violence against the others. 
For example, Samuel Huntington portrayed the  
  
                                                             
 
12 Some recent sophisticated accounts of identity have highlighted the connection of between identity 
and ontological security (Mitzen 2005, Steele 2008). When states face a self-image which they cannot 
accept, their ‘ontological security’ or the stable sense of self is threatened and it must be reestablished 
via policy responses. Representations of the other as a threat to the self are not only a theoretical point, 
they have important security implications in international relations, for example they could lead to 
conflict or the legitimation of the use of violence. 
13 Sometimes referred to as post-structuralists or post-modernists. 
14 The self/other framework often utilized by international Relations scholars has its roots in the 
Hegelian famous master/slave dialectic. Hegel was motivated by the basic epistemic question: how can 
we know anything? The point taken is that a self always needs an ‘other’ to become stable.  
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Hispanic population as a challenge to the American identity and threatening to bifurcate the 
United States (Huntington 2004).  
 
While theoretically intriguing, the debate between conventional and critical constructivists 
yielded little insights for an empirical analysis of the role of ‘other’ in identity construction. As 
other scholars pointed out, we cannot automatically assume that every difference leads to 
antagonism. Rather what the Self does with the difference discovered in the Other is an empirical 
question, which has to be investigated (Hopf 2002). Therefore, Hansen called for “ontology of 
identity that is flexible as to the forms of identity construction that one might encounter in 
concrete foreign policies” (Hansen 2006:41). The ontological point here is that while identities 
are always relational, they are only sometimes oppositional. In order to sort through the self/other 
nexus in the process of identity construction, Rumelili suggested a typology to identify when a 
difference in identities leads to a relationship of ‘Othering’ and conflictual identities. Similarly, 
Gries argued that intergroup competition does not emerge automatically, but only when 
comparisons between groups are ‘made with salient Others’, are ‘consequential’ and are ‘framed 
in zero-sum terms’ (Gries 2005). The following figure, which is adapted from Rumelili (2004), 
graphically represents the conditions under which relations between self/other could lead to 




Figure 1 : The role of ‘other’ in Self’s identity formation: the constitutive dimensions of self/other interaction15 
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As follows from the figure, while some identities may be inclusive, and can accommodate 
difference, others are exclusive and defined around some inherent characteristics. These 
understandings about the nature of identity are nevertheless not set in stone or constant but rather 
contingent and to a large degree socially contested and politically constructed. Secondly, when 
the content of identity is contested by the ‘Other’ in its identity performances, the Self is rendered 
more insecure as it blurs the boundaries between the two. Such an ontological insecurity 
generates a greater necessity for the Self to reinstate its identity by representing the Other as a 
threat to the Self. Lastly, exclusive identities based on inherent differences between the Self and 
Other need to be re-established with clear boundaries to prevent the Other from become like Self. 
These oppositional constructions naturally decrease the level of affinity between the Self and 
Other, which makes it easier to present the Other as a threat to the Self’s identity. These 
discursive practices actively link the construction of identity to the legitimisation of violence 
against the outside groups (Fearon and Laitin 2000).  
 
2.3.3. The role of historical memory in the process of identity construction 
History is an important raw source in the state identity formation. History provides the glue that 
binds the ‘imagined communities’ together into nation-states. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between past, present and identity is not linear or predetermined but rather contingent and 
dependent on actors’ interpretation of the past. Trouillot argued that history could either mean a 
socio-historical process or our knowledge of that process, and the boundary between these two 
meanings is often quite fluid (Trouillot 1995:3). Past is always negotiated to the present through 
collective memory, viable representations of the past that occur on the collective level. 
 
These constructions of the past, present and visions of the future are always contested among 
different groups and are often a product or a by-product of domestic political struggles. The 
process and conditions of history narratives production need to be examined. Historical memory 
or what is said and acknowledged that happened in the past, is therefore neither an elite 
construction, nor a monolithic entity that is not amenable to change. Rather, the past is negotiated 




narratives, the stories people tell about themselves (Gries 2007). While elites influence narratives, 
they lack the power to invent them from scratch. The process on the one hand requires agents 
who have the legitimacy and knowledge and on the other agents who accept this narrative and 
carry it along. Formulating a narrative is always open to contestation, therefore, the process and 
conditions of history narratives production need to be examined. Some groups might advocate a 
clean break from the past, others might insist on the continuity of the ‘othering’ as following 
from history and being an important part in their current perception of the ‘other’. An important 
theme to investigate is who has the power to create the dominant narratives and whose voices are 
on the other hand marginalized. Constructing a dominant narrative is a part of a political project 
that could legitimate action and provide for ontological security for the people (Kinnvall 2004, 
Krolikowski 2008). 
 
As Gustafsson noted in his discussion of the importance of narratives in Sino- Japanese relations, 
collectives define their relation to a ‘historical other’ in a variety of way, which depends on the 
aspects of the other that are emphasized as different or even dangerous (see Figure 1). The other 
against which a society is presently defined could be either its own past, as it was for example the 
case for the European Union, or an external ‘other’ as a physical entity. As he astutely observed, 
the discourses of difference only emphasize certain aspects of the ‘other’ as being different from 
the present Self, while the other differences will be marginalized or transformed into sameness. 
Therefore, a past aggressor’s violence might only be depicted as a part of the ‘historical self’, 
while the ‘current other’ on the other hand is understood as peaceful and not posing any threat to 
the physical or ontological security of the Self. This debate highlights the importance of 
relationship between historical memory and identity; the way the historical self and other are 
remembered shapes how the current self and the current other and its actions are viewed and 
understood at the moment (Gustafsson 2011: 45). 
 
Relating the theoretical debate to the current state of Sino-Japanese relations, if China’s current 
identity is based on the historical wrongdoings Japan did to China, then the Chinese will continue 
to interpret every Japanese action through that prism. Therefore, history is not just a matter of the 






century and continues to inform China’s relationship with Japan. Japanese aggression is therefore 
not merely a historical event but rather a continuing Japanese attitude towards China which 
persists until this day.   
 
Identity stability and change- identity crisis 
Despite the prominence and relative stability and endurance of some identities, they can never 
really be fixed and are amenable to change.16 As Wendt argued: “social identities not inherently 
stable or unstable, stability is a product of practices of representations of self and other in certain 
ways” (Wendt 1994). Legro called this condition the ‘plasticity of anarchy’; constructivists see 
identity as neither a product of systemic pressures nor as a never changing and self-reproducing 
entity, but rather as fluid, stemming from both domestic and international sources (Legro 2009). 
He noted that the literature on identity is vague on when changes in identity occurs and does not 
provide generalizable propositions that could be tested in different contexts (Ibid: 38). As Dittmer 
and Kim argue, identity change, or identity crises comes upon “when the previously accepted 
psychical and psychological definitions of the collective self are no longer acceptable in the light 
new political, economic and/or sociological, developments” (Dittmer and Kim 1993:7). Ringmar 
called this period of time, a ‘formative moment’, when old identities are broken down and new 
ones are put into their place (Ringmar 1996). At this time old meanings are renegotiated and new 
ones become established, nevertheless, the change is neither smooth nor automatic, but rather 
depends on the existence of new replacement ideas to fit in the place of the old ones. Secondly, 
the new ideas must carry sufficient promise to appeal to the wider audiences and must be seen as 
a being able to deliver the promised change. The old ideas that were the basis of the old identities 
can re-emerge again if the new ideas do not fare well. Historical memory contestations and 
changes in remembering are an important part of the process of identity renegotiation and often a 
sign of identity change. 
 
Therefore an identity crisis and a subsequent change in a country’s identity can precipitate 
substantial change in security interests and even national security policy. As Ringmar put it, “the 
narratives we construct about our state will specify who we are and what role do we play in the 
world; how our national ‘interests’ are to be  
  
                                                             
 
16 This is not merely a moot theoretical point, but rather needs to be empirically investigated.  
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defined, or which foreign policy to pursue” (Ringmar 1996: 455).  For example, both Japan in 
the 19
th
 century and Soviet Union at the end of 20
th
 century dramatically redefined their identities, 
which lead to a fundamental change in their foreign policies (Larson and Shevchenko 2003).  
 
2.3.4. Studying identity through discourse analysis 
If identity is an inherently unstable and contested concept, how can we make identity analytically 
and conceptually useful? How is an identity constructed and reconstructed and, who are the most 
important actors in the process? When we want to further study identity, how can we recognize it 
and where shall we look for it? There are inherent constraints on any attempts to quantify identity, 
as it cannot be readily measured or quantified in the same way positivists treat other variables.17 
Scholars suggested that the content and contestation of identity could be pinpointed via discourse 
analysis, which is a “qualitative and interpretive recovery of meaning from the language actors 
use to describe and understand social phenomena” (Abdelal et al 2006: 702). Talking is central to 
what people do and who they are, which is an important constitutive component of identity 
formation. As Epstein noted, the methodological advantage of discourse analysis is that it can 
travel through analytical levels, from individual to state. Therefore, focusing on discourses can be 
an empirically grounded way of putting together the different levels of analysis in international 
relations. The key to the study of discourse is according to Epstein identifying of ‘who speaks’, 
which can uncover complex power relations both inside and outside of state (Epstein 2011). In 
international relations, states inherently position themselves to or against other states by adopting 
certain discourses, and these juxtapositions help us identify the most important aspects of state 
identity. Hansen suggested a methodology through which the identity constructions could be 







                                                             
 
17 Nevertheless, some scholars have tried to quantify identity through large sample quantitative 
questionnaires (Gries et al 2011). 
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Figure 2: Framework to study identity through discourse analysis.  
 
Adapted from Hansen (2006: 67).  
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As opposed to quantitative approaches to the study of international relations, discourse analysis 
requires a degree of cultural sensitivity, which is necessary in order to comprehend variations in 
meanings and representations. As Neumann noted in his discussion of discourse analysis 
(Neumann 2008: 61-77), given the abundance rather than paucity of sources, we need to 
prioritize and identify the most important ones, which help to answer the research puzzle. For 
example, public speeches of political elites, policy statements, white papers, and records of 
government meetings are important source of identity construction, as state leaders articulate 
conceptions of national identity with the greatest salience. In addition, standardized school 
textbooks, newspaper articles or even cultural monuments, commemorating certain events in the 
past, can bring attention to some issues as important to the identity construction (Gustafsson 2011, 
Denton 2005). 
Secondly, according to Neumnann, we should begin by identifying those terms that indicate a 
clear construction of the Other and the Self, such as evil, good, justified, attacked, which have to 




analytical construction of identity requires identifying which sings are articulated, how they are 
stabilized, and where slips and instabilities between these constructions occur. Foreign policy 
discourses have spatial, temporal and ethical constructions, all which need to be identified and 
uncovered. These constructions serve as analytical lenses, which guide the research to uncover 
the parameters foreign policy discourse. Identity’s spatial dimension always involves the 
construction of boundaries; its temporal dimension deals with themes such as development, 
change, and repetition. Therefore, the task for the researcher is to map the changes in the spatial 
and temporal dimensions of identity discourse vis-a-vis developments in the state foreign policy 
in order to establish the effects of identity on policy.  
 
2.3.5 Identity and foreign policy  
While the above paragraphs have elaborated on various aspects of identity, its formation and 
change, they have not yet directly engaged with the most important challenge of identity to 
international relations, namely its impact on a country’s foreign policy. If our understanding of 
foreign policy is more complex than “the response of a pre-given subject, whether singular or 
plural, to its environment”, (Campbell 1998: x), then identity can greatly enhance our 
understanding of foreign policy. Nevertheless, to make it analytically useful in international 
politics, we need to firstly specify the context of state identity in a particular context (Banchoff 
1999). Identity is inherently Janus-faced, states do not have a single monolithic identity, but 
rather as Legro put it “distinct multiple facets of identity that are activated in different contexts 
and issue areas” (Legro 2009:40). Therefore, China can be socialist, revisionist, and/or 
developing country, with different views and actions, which all depend on the context. Any 
constructivist analysis of foreign policy must shift the analytical attention to the state level of 
analysis. It must explore the links between the identity embedded in the national politics, and the 
formulation and pursuit of interests. Wendt famously argued that identities serve as the basis of 
interests (Wendt 1992: 398), however, the relationship between identity and interests remains 
underspecified.  
 
A particular methodological challenge to studying identity for constructivists is not to conflate 




the other. As Bukovansky put it “the relationship between identity and interest is dialectical in 
that both identities and interests may be reconstituted in the political process; and it is through the 
political process that roles and policies are adopted and challenged” (Bukovansky 1997: 211). 
However, we need to be careful when utilizing identity, as we cannot easily force identity into the 
rationalist explanatory framework, which would strip it of its normative and historical 
dimensions and so would only reduce it into a cognitive instrument in the pursuit of material 
interests (Banchoff 1999: 262). Rather we need to rethink the relationship between identity and 
behaviour, which can be seen as safeguarding certain identities, as creating boundaries and 
forging bonds. Or secondly, we can think of action as an instrument to manifest identity and 
desire for a particular Self to be satisfied. Nevertheless, identity cannot be conflated with foreign 
policy, as in some post-structuralist scholarship (Campbell 1998). Identity inherently suffers from 
an ’agency deficit’ and does not directly ‘generate motivational dispositions’ (McCourt 2011). 
Identity is not by itself a concept that has action at its heart and therefore according to McCourt 
we cannot automatically assume a direct link between a certain identity and action and therefore 
we need to import agency into identity-based accounts. Similarly Hopf argued, that identity thus 
shapes notions of interest, identities are linked, causally and constitutively, to foreign policy 
attitudes (Hopf 2005). On the other hand, other scholars suggested abandoning the concept of 
interest altogether when incorporating identity into analytical frameworks of foreign behavior 
(Ashizawa 2008). 
 
To make identity analytically useful, scholars produced insightful analytical frameworks to make 
sense of the identity/behaviour nexus. For example, Banchoff (1999) suggested a two–step 
framework to first pinpoint the content of state identity and secondly establish its effects on state 
action. To pinpoint the content of identity, we firstly need to delineate the policy idea in question, 
then secondly, select evidence that illuminates the content of state identity in the given case, such 
as the public discourse of political elites, media images, and education. Thirdly, we can analyse 
the descriptive and narrative dimensions of identity discourse, which delineate identity such as 
how states are identified as friends or foes, or which memories are articulated as a backdrop for 
current politics. Lastly, the persistence of identity over time must be demonstrated. Identity must 




some expression of contemporary domestic forces. 
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The second step in Banchoff’s framework would be to point out how an identity constrains state 
behaviour; constructivists must demonstrate that publicly articulated conceptions of state identity 
can constrain the course of foreign policy goals and behaviour in a given international context. 
Banchoff’s framework comprises two components of state action: communicative and 
behavioural. While rationalist approaches to international relations tend to emphasize the 
behavioural aspects of state action, such as specific state policy, constructivists pay attention to 




international politics; talk is ‘not cheap’, but helps to shape reality. 
 
When determining the effect of identity on state action, firstly, we need to specify the descriptive 
and narrative dimensions of state identity. The descriptive dimension of identity discourse 
reduces the complexity of the international environment by setting states in a particular temporal 
and spatial context (Banchoff 1999: 270). Moreover, it describes the state position with respect to 
the other states and in these descriptions some relationships emerge as more important than 
others. This could be captured by describing a state’s position with respect to other state, as to 
have an identity means to know where we are coming from and suggest visions for the future. 
Secondly, we need to demonstrate a powerful link between the narrative dimension of identity 
and the articulation of security interests. Finally, we have to demonstrate the effects of identity: 
state behaviour should not contradict state identity. Similarly, if domestic actors attack policies 
for their non-conformity to an identity, then the state identity can be seen as very strong. When a 
foreign policy fundamentally stems from state identity, then the foreign policy follows a specific 




This chapter mapped the richness of international relations theorizing. First of all, the dominant 
theories, realism and liberalism, were introduced and applied to Sino-Japanese relations and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. Afterwards, constructivism as an alternative theoretical 
paradigm for the understanding of Sino-Japanese relations was juxtaposed to the rationalist 
theories. This meta-theoretical step paved the way for the introduction of the concept of identity 
in international relations, which is the focus of this research project. Central dimensions of 
identity, namely its formation, stability and impact on foreign policy were subsequently 
addressed. The detailed discussion was necessary in order to prepare the ground for further 
explorations and analysis of China’s identity in chapters 4 and 5 which discuss the developments 
in China’s identity after 1989 and China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, 
respectively.  
 




formative events in China’s history, which serve as important foundations of China’s identity. 
The continuing importance of the Opium Wars and particularly Sino-Japanese Wars in China’s 
relations with Japan necessitates a detailed discussion of these historical events.  
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Chapter 3: Sino-Japanese relations: 
The continuing importance of history 
3.1. Past in the present 
Since the end of the Cold War, historical controversies have emerged as one of the most heated 
issues in Sino-Japanese relations (Rose 2005, Gong and Teo 2010). While interpretations of 
history always divided China and Japan, and were sometimes manifested in brief disputes, such 
as the 1982 Japanese textbook controversy, nevertheless, history only played second fiddle to 
economic cooperation after the 1972 normalisation of relations. The 1982 incident, which 
resulted from an apparent Japanese move to approve a history textbook that whitewashed 
Japanese atrocities in China, 18  briefly captured the attention of both countries, but was, 
nevertheless, quickly swept under the carpet and overall caused little damage to the bilateral 
relationship (Rose 1998).  
 
As elaborated in chapter 2, historical memory, the way the past is remembered in the present is an 
important component of state identity. Collective memory plays an important role in uniting a 
group of people, which defines who the group members are and who are outside of the group. 
The collective membership to a group is often defined around a collection of stories about the 
past that could be either positive or negative. Particularly important historical events in a state’s 
history, the so called ‘chosen traumas’ and ‘chosen glories’ are constitutive elements of the group 
identity formation (Wang 2012: 20-23). These constitutive stories are reproduced in the society 
and passed to subsequent generations both through state institutions and family members. 
Therefore, future generations could share the suffering or humiliations of their ancestors even 
though they are not the victims themselves. Thus, historical memory can serve as an important 
foundation of foreign behaviour that shapes a country’s foreign policy or patterns of interactions 
between in the international area.  
 
3.1.1 The historical foundations of China’s ‘victimized’ identity 
Since the end of the Cold War, the modern period in China’s history since mid-19
th
 century, has 
received much more attention at the domestic level in China, particularly  
  
                                                             
 
18 For example when discussing the Japanese invasion of China during the Second World War, the 
textbook would state that the Japanese army ‘advanced’ and not ‘invaded’, etc.  
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in education and popular culture (Callahan 2004, He 2009, Wang 2012). Interestingly, the 
historical narratives focused less on glorifying the achievements of the Chinese people in the past, 
as official narratives tend to do, but rather paid close attention to the defeats, injustices and 
humiliations China suffered in the past (Kaufman 2010). The discourse on China’s past 
humiliations revolves around its central theme- the Century of Humiliation and the quest to 
restore China’s dignity and power.  
 
The Century of Humiliation refers to the 100-odd years from the First Opium War of 1839 when 
China lost its position of predominant power in Asia to the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 when Chinese people according to Mao Zedong, ‘stood up’. 
The key events during the century-long period were the two Opium Wars when China was 
defeated and forced to grant concessions to Western imperialist powers and two Sino-Japanese 
Wars when parts of China were invaded and subjected to brutal occupation.19 In the words of 
Kaufmann, the Century of Humiliation serves as “a historical touchstone for China’s aspirations” 
and continues to impact China’s foreign relations today (Kaufmann, 2010: 26).  
 





centuries that have recently come to the forefront of China’s foreign relations with Japan. These 
events matter not so much in themselves, but rather because they shape China’s understandings 
of itself and others in the 21
st
 century. Discussing these historical events is especially important 
in order to understand contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, and particularly to account for 
China’s position towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. This chapter proceeds as follows: 
firstly, I discuss the two Opium Wars and the two Sino-Japanese Wars with the focus on the most 
important events and facts themselves. Afterwards, I analyse their psychological impact on 
China’s consciousness. I highlight the idiosyncratic relations between China and Japan, 
particularly the change of relative status between the two following the subjugation China 
suffered. 
 
3.2 The Opium Wars: 1839-1860: The first blow to China’s self-confidence 
The term Opium Wars refers to two separate military conflicts, the 1839-1842 and 1856-1860 
wars, which were the consequence of a trade and diplomacy dispute  
  
                                                             
 
19Nevertheless, there are some in China who claim that the humiliation will only end once Taiwan is 
reunited politically with the Chinese Mainland. 
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between China and the United Kingdom.20 The First Opium War was an overwhelming British 
military victory, when the British forces easily defeated the Chinese Imperial army in a string of 
land and naval battles. The war resulted in a series of concessions to Britain, also known as 
‘unequal treaties’, such as the resumption of the opium trade, opening of new treaty ports and the 
cession of Hong Kong Island. The Second Opium War waged in 1856-1860 was largely fought 
for similar reasons, when the Qing dynasty refused the demands of Western imperialist powers. 
The conflict was another decisive Western victory; in 1857 the joint Anglo-French forces took 
Guangzhou and following a crucial naval battle, the British captured strategic coastal cities up to 
Shanghai. In 1860 Beijing was occupied for a month and during the occupation, the Western 
armies destroyed the Yuanming Yuan palace. The Palace was the home of beautiful gardens and 
also was also a repository of the best Chinese art and literature, and later came to symbolize the 
destruction and humiliation brought upon China (Ringmar 2011). The Second Opium War was 
concluded with the Convention of Peking, where China was obliged to pay indemnities, legalize 
the opium trade in China, and cede Kowloon to Britain. In both wars, China was defeated due to 
its inferior military modernisation; the Western infantry and navy possessed superior firepower 
and therefore easily defeated the numerically superior Chinese army.  
 
The Opium Wars brought upon monumental changes to China which culminated in the demise of 
the Qing monarchy and the establishment of the Republic of China. Writing half a century ago, 
Richard Harris noted their significance and claimed that Chinese think about their history in 
terms of before and after the Opium Wars (Harris 1959). Prior to the confrontation with the West, 
China sat at a pinnacle of social hierarchy in Asia and the Sino-centric regional order effectively 
reproduced the social hierarchy and Chinese superiority. Nevertheless, after the Opium Wars, 
China was reduced to a semi-colonial country itself, ‘carved up like a melon’ (guafen) and 
divided into foreign spheres of influence. 
 
Following the Opium Wars and the collapse of its self-image, China was faced by an identity 
crisis which turned it to re-examine its identity. China gradually underwent a transition into a 
modern polity; the previously accepted social relations started to  
  
                                                             
 
20 One of the best history books on the subject is Julia Lowell’s ‘The Opium War: drugs, dreams and the 
making of China’, which has been consulted for this chapter. (Lowell 2011).  
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erode and were supplanted by new sets of ideas. The Chinese tributary system was based on 
cultural rather than on national differences (Chen 2005) and was dominated by Confucian 
self-images of Self and Other. Its advanced culture had been the basis for Chinese superiority 
towards the ‘Others’, who were often referred only to as ‘barbarians’ (yidi). Nevertheless, after 
the central argument of the Chinese civilisation- the superiority of Chinese culture - collapsed 
and the Chinese began to embrace notions of Chinese nation and Chinese state (Chen 2005: 38). 
The Chinese ‘self-strengthening’ represented more than just economic and military 
modernisation, but more importantly a change in Chinese identity, an attempt to redefine and 
reinvent China. The encounter with the West forced the Chinese to accept Western notions, such 
as nation, state, sovereignty, citizenship, identity, when driven by the urge to become a strong 
nation again and to repel any future invasion and to redress injustices done to the Chinese people, 
which is the second central theme in the Century of Humiliation narrative. Therefore, the quest 
for a new national identity was driven by the urge to make China a strong and powerful state 
again. 
 
3.3 The Sino-Japanese Wars: 1894-1945: The darkest hour of Sino-Japanese 
history 
Even though the defeats by Western countries decisively impacted on China and shook the 
Chinese self-confidence, the greatest subjugation and humiliation was inflicted by Japan (Chan 
and Bridges 2006:131). Both China and Japan were originally affected by Western imperialism in 
the mid-19
th
 century; what the Opium Wars meant for China, the arrival of Black Ships of 
Commodore Matthew Perry was for Japan. Japan also had to accept the terms of international 
society that were very different from its own (Legro 2009, Suzuki 2009), was forced to make 
concessions to foreign powers and realized its own technological backwardness and need for 
reform. However, the Meiji Restoration managed in an incredibly short time to reform the 
country, which led to enormous changes in the political and social structure of Japan, such as 
power centralised under the Emperor and the abolishment of the Samurai class. Nevertheless, 
unlike the Chinese modernisation efforts, Japan succeeded in modernizing both its economy and 
its military, which allowed the emergence of Japan as a great power in less than fifty years and 




Sino-Japanese relations.21  
 
The success and failure of Japan’s and China’s modernisation programs became particularly 
pronounced during the First Sino-Japanese War from 1894-95. The War emerged out of a dispute 
over influence on the Korean peninsula. Traditionally, Korea was a part of China’s tributary 
system and was reduced to a semi-colonial status. Nevertheless, Japanese expansionism targeted 
Korea, and Japan started actively meddling into Korea’s affairs in the late 19
th
 century. The 
Sino-Japanese competition for dominance over Korea culminated in the First Sino-Japanese War. 
Following a brief period of fighting, Japan pushed Chinese forces out of Korea and even 
occupied the Liaodong Peninsula. The First Sino-Japanese War was concluded with the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, which forced China to recognise the independence of Korea, cede Taiwan as well 
as open ports to Japan. On behalf of China the treaty was signed by Li Hongzhang, a leading 
statesman of the Qing Empire. Unfortunately for him, his name entered history as symbol of 
weakness and he has been depicted as a traitor in modern official Chinese historiography.  
 
Following the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan created a colonial empire itself and joined the 
ranks of Western powers exploiting China by forcing unequal treaties. Subsequent relations 
between China and Japan were not based on the principle of equality, but rather on Japanese 
expansionism. Japanese imperialism culminated in 1930s and 1940s; in 1931 Japanese soldiers 
conspired to blow up a railway and use it as a pretext for an invasion of Manchuria,22 which 
became known as the Mukden Incident. The Second Sino-Japanese War23 from 1937-1945 
nevertheless became the most traumatic experience during the Century of Humiliation and the 
darkest hour of Sino-Japanese relations. The 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident evolved into a 
full-scale war between China and Japan, which ended only after the Japanese capitulation in 1945. 
The atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army in China have left a profound legacy of 
humiliation and resentment. Japanese troops  
  
                                                             
 
21 A Japanese historian writes that the success of Japanese reforms as compared to China can be 
attributed to three additional factors: the imperialist pressure was not so strong, Japan learnt about 
China’s defeats in time and also the lack of Japan’s egocentrism enabled Japan to admit its weakness to 
pursue necessary reforms in time (Kitaoka 2011).  
22 The area covers contemporary Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces. The events are also known 
as the ‘18 September Incident’ in China.  
23 Also known as the ‘War of resistance against Japan’ in China.  
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were found responsible for mass killings, human experimentation, biological and chemical 
warfare as well as forcing women into sexual slavery (the co called ‘comfort women’).  
 
Nevertheless, the Nanjing Massacre came down through history as the most horrible atrocity, 
when the Japanese army killed between 250,000-300,000 civilians after the capture of Nanjing in 
September 1937. As Rose noted it is difficult to quantify the atrocities committed both against 
Chinese troops and civilians by the Japanese army, but the reliable estimates are somewhere 
around 10 million people (Rose 1998:15). Overall, the war left deep physical and psychological 
scars on China, the country suffered major devastation and conceivably around 20 million 
casualties, making it one of the most devastating conflicts in history.  
 
3.4 Emergence of Japan as the Other 
The sense of inferiority and humiliation was particularly acute when China was compared to 
Japan; the two Sino-Japanese wars were a particularly bitter psychological blow to China. Firstly, 
China has always considered itself superior to Japan; China’s ‘younger brother’ was a part of the 
Chinese tributary system and had to pay tribute to China. Culturally, Japan was heavily 
influenced by China; Buddhism as well as Chinese characters were introduced to Japan from 
China. Nevertheless, Japan was much quicker at modernizing in the 19
th
 century and coping with 
the new challenges and therefore supplanted China as the greatest power in Asia. Therefore the 
shock and the subsequent humiliation was even more pronounced. As one Western scholar put it: 
 
“[while] China was already accustomed to rapacious Western powers squabbling over its riches, 
but had remained self-confident in the knowledge of these powers’ irrelevance. However, the 
assault from Japan, a speck of dust in its own backyard, shattered this self-assurance and was 
experienced as a shocking and intolerable humiliation” (Greenfeld 2012). 
 
Secondly, the inequality and often brutality with which Japan treated China led to indignation 
among the Chinese people. Originally, the bilateral relationship had been between equal based on 
the Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty of 1871, but, following the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, Japan started to systematically exploit China. The 1915 ‘21 Demands to China’, 




were unfair, led to outbursts of anti-Japan sentiment and an upsurge in nationalism, which later 
culminated in the May 4 Movement (Luo 1993). 24  The exploitation of China by Japan 
manifested in the brutal conduct of the Japanese troops in China during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, especially towards the civilian population. Especially, the Nanjing Massacre 
stands out as a shocking example of the atrocities committed by the Japanese army.25  
 
Before the Japanese invasion in 1930s, Chinese people identified with Japan and only afterward 
the national consciousness changed against Japan. The 1894-95 War was no longer understood as 
only the defeat of Manchu Empire, but rather became a defeat of the Chinese people themselves 
(Friedman 1995: 137). Nevertheless, following the Second Sino-Japanese War the sentiments 
changed completely and Japan became China’s worst enemy. The wrongdoings and injustices 
committed by Japan were acutely felt by the Chinese people. From that time, Japanese were 
referred to in China as devils (guizi), which captured the Chinese deep-seated feelings of 
animosity and resentment. While periodically Sino-Japanese relations improved at the official 
level, at the personal level, the Chinese people were not able to forget the wrongs Japan 
committed in China.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Opium and Sino-Japanese Wars had a decisive impact on the evolution of modern China and 
its identity. The defeat in the Opium Wars started monumental transformative processes that 
eventually led to the abolishment of the Chinese Empire and the establishment of the Republic of 
China. China embraced Western notions of nation and state and started a transformation into a 
modern polity. Similarly, the importance of Sino-Japanese Wars in China cannot be 
overestimated. Not only did the two events led to a change of government in China, but rather 
fundamentally defined the relations between China and Japan. As a result of the atrocities 
committed in China, Japan became the Other against whom China became to define itself. Even 
after almost 70 years, the deep-seated feelings of resentment are felt acutely among people in 
China.  
 
Nevertheless, the traumatic experiences of the past have not stayed in the history  
  
                                                             
 
24 The 1919 Treaty of Versailles gave German concessions in China to Japan.  




textbooks only, but continued to frame the bilateral relations between China and Japan. The 
following chapters build upon the historical background and demonstrate how the current 




 century. The 
following chapter discusses the changes of China’s self-understanding after 1989. I argue that 
China has embraced a new, ‘victimized’ identity as a result of the identity crisis China was 
embroiled in since 1989. Japan, viewed through the prism of history, became the Other against 
which the new Chinese identity became defined.  
 




Chapter 4: China’s identity after 1989 
4.1 China’s socialist identity during the Cold War 
In 1949, the PRC was established and Communism became the official ideology in China. 
Although Japan was the main enemy during the Second World War26 and the legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was directly tied to its anti-Japanese resistance (Johnson 1962), 
the fellow-Chinese, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) with their American sponsors, and not 
Japan, became the main ‘Other’ against which the new Chinese socialist identity was defined. 
Following an exhausting war, the state discourse focused on positive identifications, such as the 
heroism of the Chinese (Communist) soldiers and the victory in the War against Japan (Gries 
2004: 72-79). Contributions by the Nationalist troops were overlooked and all credit was given 
solely to the Communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong. While the atrocities committed by 
the Japanese army were not entirely forgotten, they were simply laid aside as they did not fit into 
the national identity discourse, which championed the building of the ‘new man’ and the 
development of communism in China (Reilly 2006).27 There was no meaningful discussion on 
the roles the Nationalists and Communists had played in the War, or the nature of Chinese 
collaboration/resistance against Japan in the occupied areas (Mitter 2003).Anti-Japanese 
sentiment persisted primarily at the personal level, but was supressed and marginalized in the 
state dominant discourse, which emphasized socialism/communism at the expense of 
nationalism.  
 
International implications of China’s Cold War socialist identity 
During the Cold War period China initially remained outside of the international system due to its 
capitalist-dominated leadership. Therefore, China began integration into the international society 
as a latecomer and joined the United Nations as late as in 1971. Kaufmann speculated that the 
painful memories of the century of humiliation were the driving force behind Chinese 
isolationism and a general lack of engagement with the international system (Kaufman 2010). 
The central theme of Chinese foreign policy during this period resulting from its socialist identity 
was the  
  
                                                             
 
26 Also known as the Second Sino-Japanese War, or the War of Resistance against Japan in China.  
27 In Europe, major powers, be it victorious or defeated, gradually started to critically reflect on the past, 
which became the basis for new post-war identities. Former enemies, such as Germany and Poland 
gradually embarked on a process of reconciliation.  
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resistance to ‘American imperialism’, which translated into foreign policy themes of 
anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism (Friedman 1994). The capitalist Japan became a US ally 
in the Cold War, which rendered it China’s enemy and effectively separated the two countries in 
the early Cold War period and reduced bilateral relations. In 1950, China signed the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the USSR. China’s socialist identity was manifested again 
after the outbreak of the Korean War. China entered the conflict on the behalf of the communist 
North after an exogenously triggered mobilization of China’s national identity (Dittmer and Kim 
1993: 259). 
 
Tensions within China’s socialist identity 
Despite being firmly embedded in the state structure and domestic political discourse, China’ 
socialist identity did not remain uncontested during the Cold War period. Periodic tensions within 
the identity discourse, such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, concerned 
different interpretations of socialism in China. Nevertheless, the most serious external 
manifestation of China’s identity during the Cold War period was the Sino-Soviet Split. 
Competing visions of socialism led to tensions in the Sino-Soviet alliance and eventually led to 
the Sino-Soviet split. According to Hopf, Sino-Soviet relations changed following a shift of 
Soviet identity after the death of Stalin. While, following the death of Stalin, Soviet identity 
became more relaxed and inclusive, Chinese identity moved in the opposite direction and became 
even more ‘Stalinized’ (Hopf 2009: 299). The identity gap became significant as of 1959 and 
started to affect the bilateral relations, such as the Soviet refusal to pass nuclear weapon to China. 
If anything, the differing identities seemed further apart as China embarked on economic reform 
and openness after 1978, while the Soviet Union did not start reform until the second half of the 
1980s. 
 
4.2 China’s identity crisis  
As stipulated in chapter 2, while identities are endurable and stable, they are not set in stone and 
at the same time are amenable to change. The change comes usually as a result of strong pressure 
from both domestic and international levels. Temporally, the changes in identity come about 
when the preciously accepted features of the collective Self are no longer acceptable in the light 
of new political, social or economic conditions. For China, the domestic and international events 




shattered the already insecure China’s socialist identity and put the country into a state of identity 
crises from which it has still yet not recovered and is manifested in China’s international relations, 
particularly with Japan.  
 
Domestic challenges 
The year of 1989 is remembered in the West as the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, half a year 
before the wave of European revolutions, the Chinese intellectual and popular movement which 
culminated in the Tiananmen Square protests was brutally crushed by the PLA. With the demise 
of the Soviet Union socialism after a decade of liberalisation collapsed as a collective identity in 
China. As a consequence of the ideological turmoil of the previous decades, Chinese society 
lacked spiritual instruments, or sets of collective ideas, to guide the economic transition from 
state to market economy in the post-1989 world. Moreover, after the Tiananmen Incident and an 
internal conflict among the top leadership, the CCP was in a shaky position and faced an 
uncertain future. 
 
Nevertheless, at this time of ontological and political instability, Chinese society was 
experiencing profound economic and social transformations, which started with the ‘opening’ of 
China in late 1970s. Economic reforms increased the level of global transactions and at the same 
time reduced state regulatory controls (Zweig 2002), which weakened the state and decentralised 
power to local governments, but at the same time created new challenges for sustainable 
development (Cheng and Zhang 1999). As a consequence, China’s proletarian identity which had 
been the basis of the society during the Cold War, and was successfully mobilized in the 1950s 
and 1960s, started to wane, which represented a gradual decline of China’s socialist identity. 
Therefore, as a consequence of the ‘opening’, Chinese society became increasingly pluralistic, 
which started to impact Chinese politics since the mid-1980s (Chen 1995).  
 
International challenges 
After the end of the Cold War the international system was transformed from bipolarity to 
unipolarity rendering the United States the sole superpower, which rendered China’s position in 
the international society a very ambiguous one. According to one scholar, this was due to three 




liberalism was in the post-Cold War manifested in the “end of history” thesis, and China became 
labelled as “the last bastion of communism” or “the last Leninist state”, making it the “Other” in 
the international society. Secondly, China was criticized for its poor human right record and 
frequent abuses, and finally, China’s economic and military growth gave rise to a “China threat ” 
discourse in the West (Suzuki 2007:33). 28  Therefore the Western powers confirmed their 
democratic identities by positioning themselves against China, which in turn according to 
Chinese scholars spawned feelings of injustice and oppression in China (Zhang 2001, Chen 
2002).  
 
Following the Tiananmen crackdown, Western countries imposed diplomatic and economic 
sanctions, which included suspension of high-level official visits, official development assistance, 
export credits, and sales of military equipment. Consequently, in the following years, tourism, 
FDI and foreign lending declined; the latter two had played a key role in China’s economic 
development. Therefore, as a response to the new international environment, China began to 
experience a siege mentality and a belief that the West (led by the United States) intends to harm 
China. Chinese intellectuals particularly opposed the often simplistic and biased portrayal of 
China in the Western media, which did not pay enough attention and sensitivity to China’s 
development under unique conditions (Jia 2001).  
 
Moreover, they shared the belief that the West was antagonistic to China and treated China 
unfairly. Memories of the past oppression by the Western emerged again making an easy and 
obvious parallel to China’s experience during the 19
th
 century when China was bullied by 
Western powers. Wang Jisi, who now serves as the Dean of the School of International Studies at 
the Peking University captured this sentiment unambiguously: “More than half a century since 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it is still widely believed among China’s political 
elites that the United States, joined by other hostile external forces, is intent on efforts to conquer, 
divide, destabilize, and demonize China” (Wang 2001). While United States and Japan were 
viewed in the 1980s as role models to emulate, from the 1990s the Chinese views of both became 
more antagonistic (Rozman 2002).  
 
In general, while China considered the international environment more or less benign in the 
1980s, however the perception changed to a more hostile one in the 1990s,  
  
                                                             
 
28 For a post-modernist critique of the ‘China threat’ theory, see Pan (2004) 
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although the immediate Soviet threat had disappeared. Despite the fact that China normalised o 
diplomatic relations in the early 1990s with South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Singapore, events 
such as the 1995-96 Taiwan crises, when the United States responded with an unprecedented 
show of force, only confirmed the image of a belligerent and hostile America, while the 1993-94 
nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula implied an unstable regional environment. Chinese 
analysts in the early 1990s were particularly anxious about the potential “emergence of Japan as a 
military power” which would be characterized by an independent foreign policy and potential 
development of nuclear weapons and posing danger to China (Glaser 1993:256-259). Therefore, 
China’s ontological security did not increase in the post-Cold War period; China still felt insecure 
and vulnerable in the uncertain world even despite an “unprecedented peaceful national security 
environment” and an absence of a direct military threat (Shambaugh 1994:55).  
 
The fragmentation of China’s post-Cold War identity 
The events of 1989 not only weakened China’s identity, but also fragmented the process of 
identity renegotiation. As established in chapter 2, national identity is not given but constructed 
by different groups in the society. In the post-Cold War period, more than ever, according to 
analysts, China’s national identity has been less stable and more contested (Carlson 2007). Due to 
China’s economic success, China experiences more pressure from the international community to 
take leadership roles.29 Nevertheless, previously China has been always reacting to outside 
influences and pressures and feels uncomfortable with embracing leadership.  
 
While the government is the most important actor, identity formation is not entirely monopolized 
by the state. The official agents are interested in clear-cut differences, between the inside and the 
outside. However, there is a plethora of voices and actors who contest these constructions inside 
as well as outside of China. While the CCP remained the dominant voice shaping the discourse 
and identity in China, it has faced an unprecedented degree of contestation. Even though China is 
an authoritarian state and lacks a genuine political opposition, which is present in democratic 
countries, Chinese society is increasingly becoming more pluralistic and citizens have more 
  
                                                             
 




 opportunity to express their opinions and even to criticize the government (Kelly 2006, Pei 
1998).30  
 
While China’s Diaoyu/Senkaku islands policy is firmly in the hands of the Chinese government, 
especially the top leadership, the policy-making process in China has become more contested. A 
recent study identified changes in the face of China’s official decision-making apparatus and 
noted a fracturing of authority in foreign policy formulation and a diversity of approaches to 
foreign policy issues (Jakobsen and Knox 2010). Concerning Diaoyu/Senkaku islands policy, 
Chinese netizens have been particularly vocal about Sino-Japanese relations and unyielding in 
pressuring the Chinese government to adopt a tougher stance towards Japan, via protests or 
internet petitions.  
 
Moreover, civil society groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan have been very active about the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and often have taken positions very critical of Japan (Bridges 2003: 
1059-1060), as demonstrated by their repeated attempts to land on the islands.31 All these 
discourses in one way or the other challenge the dominant discourse of the government, which 
comes under pressure. Given the opacity of China’s decision-making process, it is difficult to tell 
to what extent the competing narratives shaped the dominant narrative championed by the 
Chinese government. Nevertheless, even if the direct impact is unknown, they have continued to 
frame the boundaries within which the official policy is constructed and therefore at times 
reduced or expanded the available policy possibilities.  
 
To conclude, China’s socialist identity has been significantly weakened in the post-Cold War era. 
As a consequence of both the international decline of socialism and domestic liberalisation, 
China’s socialist identity became undermined. Moreover, initially in the post-1989 world when 
suffering from international sanctions, China was reduced to a position of pariah in the 
international society. Moreover, China’s identity became much more fragmented with a plethora 
of actors shaping the developments of the new post-Cold War identity. Despite the CCP’s 
dominant position, new voices have managed to create competing narratives challenging the  
  
                                                             
 
30 Another source of competing narratives would be from the various ethnic groups in China. 
31 In Hong Kong, the groups that most loudly contest Japan’s claims to the islands are ironically among 
the fiercest critics of the Beijing government.  
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official China’s narratives, for example in areas such as relations with Japan (Gries 2005). 
 
4.3 China’s identity discourses in the post-Cold War world 
4.3.1 The decline of Western liberal ideas in economic development discourse 
As discussed in the previous section, China’s identity entered a period of insecurity and 
uncertainty in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, in the 1990s, new ideas emerged in the 
domestic political discourse in China to fill in the vacuum and stabilize China’s identity. In the 
1980s joint western-inspired political and economic reforms were championed by intellectuals 
and a part of the political leadership as the only way to modernize China. However, from the 
1990s the government actively fostered a connection between strong government and strong 
China and dismissed the theme of liberalisation. Strong government became necessary to manage 
China’s economic growth; under a weak government the economic modernisation would lead to a 
profound national crisis, jeopardizing the survival of the state (Zheng 1999: 55). Therefore, the 
discourse on China’s modernisation supressed free-market capitalism and prioritised the 
nation-state and argued that any reforms that would threaten the nation-state would be 
undesirable.  
 
The new discourse championed by the government tapped into the narrative of modern Chinese 
history, which has been full of crises which happened due to the weakness of the Imperial rule, 
the intrusion of the Western powers and subsequent humiliations of China. In the 19
th
 century, 
China due to its weakness lost effective control of one-third of its territory and was internally torn 
apart by massive rebellions, such as the Taiping rebellion. Similarly, after 1911, the Republican 
government was unable to restore order and chaos was prevalent especially during the Warlord 
era. The discourse on the strong government as a prerequisite for a strong country has its roots in 
Confucianism and legalism, which has likewise with Chinese culture been experiencing a revival 
in Chinese society following the decline of communism (Meissner 2006: 8-9).32  
 
Most importantly, the post-1989 discourse imagined the Chinese state, Chinese  
  
                                                             
 
32 For a discussion on the relationship and dynamics between the Confucius rhetoric and Marxist 
orthodoxy in contemporary official discourse in China, see Billioud (2012) 
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nation and the CCP as one and most importantly conflated the nation with the state.33 Popular 
nationalism was reconstructed into patriotism, partially out of fear of ethnic nationalisms, but 
also to consolidate the power of the Chinese government weakened by the events of 1989 and 
became in essence similar to Benedict Anderson‘s “official nationalism” (Zheng 1999: 93).  
 
4.3.2 Chinese intellectual imagining of China after 1989 
One of the most unexpected developments in the post-1989 China has been the collusion between 
state and intellectuals discourses on the future of China. While the two were quite divergent in 
1980s, in the 1990s they began to parallel each other. While in the 1980s the government was 
critical of the West (Shambaugh 1993), Chinese intellectuals rather blamed Chinese culture and 
indirectly the government for China’s backwardness (the so called ‘culture fever‘) and looked up 
to the West as a source of inspiration (Wang 1996). Namely, intellectuals encouraged by the 
economic success of reforms tried to promote a new identity for the country- ’ love the country- 
hate the government’, and championed political reforms alongside the economic ones, the so 
called ‘liberal nationalism’. Chinese intellectuals were trying to imagine a new China and wanted 
to distance it from the past; they were alienated by socialism and the state, with which they 
stopped to identify with and looked for the inspiration in the West (Zhao 2004, chapter 4).34 
They praised the economic and political successes of the American system and the legal system 
as well as checks and balances of power as examples for China to learn from. Japan was likewise 
featured and covered prominently in this discursive construction, and was presented in a very 
positive fashion (Rozman 2002:97), as a model to emulate since it was combining Western 
capitalism and Asian values.35  
 
Chinese Intellectuals perceived acutely the situation China was in after 1989; they were aware of 
the domestic and international predicaments China was facing. While  
  
                                                             
 
33 The fate of the River Elegy television series is perhaps the most striking example of struggle of 
competing narratives in the post 6/4 China. After June 4, an official attack from the conservative 
circles was launched against the series and it subsequently became banned in China.  
34 The search for a new national identity culminated with the River Elegy television series, which 
explicitly called for a transformation of China along the Western standards (Ma 1996)  
35 Yang and Lim observed that the “idolisation of Western societies and the sense of national crisis of 
the intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s bear great similarities to intellectuals in the late 19th century 
and early 20th century” (Yang and Lim 2010: 467). 
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perhaps during the 1980s the anti-traditionalism which dominated the intellectual discourse in 
China was too cynical towards Chinese culture and too naive and optimistic towards the West, 
the trend was completely reversed in the next decade. As a consequence, Zhao argued, 
intellectuals developed a sense for a new collective identity for the Chinese people (Zhao 1997: 
731) which supressed idealisation of the West. They criticized the United States for interfering 
into the domestic politics of different countries and for inconsistencies in it behaviour. A 
prominent scholar and member of the executive counsel of the The Chinese Association of 
American Studies castigated US foreign behavior: 
 
“This bullying approach (of the United States) may style itself as “playing a leadership role” or 
“assuming” some “duty,” but in fact it is placing itself in a predicament, being bereft of support 
because of pursuing unjust causes and incapable of imposing its will upon others” (Yang 
1991:162 quoted in Niu 2006). 
 
Some neo-conservative scholars, such as He Xin offered strong critiques of United States foreign 
policy and Chinese intellectuals admiring the United States. He argued that the US will try to 
undermine China and its development, particularly in the post-cold War period “the United States 
will accelerate its efforts to subvert China’s economy, create internal chaos and finally divide and 
dissolve China” (He 1991:393 quoted in Niu 2006).  
 
Given that the westernisation in post-Soviet Russia ended up in a complete failure, it brought 
back uneasy memories of a weak China being exploited by Western powers and Japan, making 
the strong state as the only prerequisite for a strong China became inevitable. Moreover, 
according to Zhao, the Chinese intellectuals were very sensitive to the popular works in the West 
that impacted China as well, such as The End of History and the Last Man as well as Clash of 
Civilisations, which confirmed the scepticism of the Chinese intellectuals about the hostile 
intentions of the West, especially the United States. As a response came a wave of popular books 
such as including China Can Say No (zhongguo keyi shuo bu, 1996), Behind the Demonization of 
China (zai yaomohua zhongguo de beihou, 1996) and The Way Out for China: Under the Shadow 
of Globalization (Quanqiu hua yinying xia de zhongguo zhi lu, 1999), which became bestsellers, 
shared a strong critique of the West and Western-influenced intellectuals in China who are 





of the Chinese intellectuals about the unfair treatment of China by the Western countries, 
especially the United States, in the early 1990s. The rejection of China’s bid to join the World 
Trade Organisation, failure to win the bid for the 2000 summer Olympics and generally blames 
the United States for making China the scapegoat of its problems. The book also criticized 
Japan’s polices and attitudes towards Japan, rejected Japan’s bid for the Permanent Seat in UNSC 
and called for reparations for Japan’s actions during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Song et al 
1996).  
 
Therefore, we could concur with one Chinese scholar who observed a “drastic discourse turn of 
Chinese intellectual circles” following the Tiananmen Incident (Niu 2006). The official and 
intellectual discourse coincided in their critique of the Western liberalism and the support of a 
strong state and Party seemed the only viable way for intellectuals to redress the past injustices 
and make China richer and stronger. 
 
4.4 China’s ‘victimized identity’ 
The construction of national identity is a contested process during which political actors 
articulate and gain recognition for memories and narratives that underpin specific constructions 
of identity (Callahan 2010, Wang 2012). Policies often tap into public memory in order to 
mobilize societal resources when articulating particular visions of collective identity. The CCP in 
order to restore China from its identity crises and to shore up its waning legitimacy brought up 
the discursive theme of foreign aggression and Chinese victimization. Renwick and Cao noted 
the emergence of a new discursive theme of ‘victimhood’ in the Chinese political discourse since 
the 1990s (Renwick and Cao 1999).36 Renwick and Cao note that the discourse has overlapping 
characteristics and themes which are not new to China, such as anti-foreignism, modernism, 
nationalism and culturalism, which are related yet different discursive themes. Nevertheless, 
these themes have replaced the traditionally hegemonic discourse of Marxism-Leninism in 
today’s China. The key part of the discourse is the idea of China as a victim of external 
oppression. China thus identifies as a ‘victim’ in dangerous world where it is surrounded by 
bellingerent ‘vicitmizing others’, such as the United States or Japan. Deng Xiaoping expressed  
  
                                                             
 
36 While their claim that it could be called the new hegemonic discourse of the post-Tiananmen era is 
perhaps a bit exaggerated, it certainly became more visible in the post-1989 China. 
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this sentiment in 1989 when China was condemned following the Tiananmen Incident:  
 
“I am Chinese, and understand the history of foreign invasions of China. When I heard that 
sanctions against China had been decided at the G-7 summit, I immediately thought of the time 
when the Eight-Nation Alliance invaded China in 1900. With the exception of Canada, all the 
countries, with the addition of Tsarist Russia, were members of the Alliance” (Deng 1993:358).  
 
Atanassova-Cornelis noted that victimization discourse, which utilizes United States and Japan as 
the significant ‘Others’, has been one of the three major aspects in China’s national identity, 
following the end of Cold War (Atanassova-Cornelis 2012).37 In 2001, China’s National People’s 
Congress even passed a law proclaiming an official “National Humiliation Day.” However a 
specific day was never agreed upon, because there were just so many good candidates for that 
day, such as 7 July or 18 September (People’s Daily 29/4/2001). 
 
While especially prominent today, China’s victim identity was not an entirely new identity; it has 
existed before 1989 but was rather marginalized due to the more dominant socialist identity in 
China. The theme of ‘victimhood has been present in the entire modern Chinese history, has its 
origins in the resistance to Western powers in the mid-19
th
 century, but its significance has been 
changing over time. The narrative itself has a distinctively modernist character; it adopted themes 
such as citizen, state and class, which makes it an explicitly future-oriented discourse (Renwick 
and Cao 1999:114). The 1990s upsurge of writing on national humiliation and the prominence of 
the discourse of victimisation were similar to the sentiment of the Republican era. In both periods 
the emphasis was in the official discourse on the shameful humiliations China suffered from the 
Western powers following the Opium Wars. KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny 
(1943) lamented the humiliations China has suffered. The discourse on humiliation and 
victimhood in China is selective in its prioritisation of the suffering of the Chinese. It captures the 
moral high-ground for China as a ‘peaceful state’, which became the innocent victim of the 
aggressive Western powers. Denton captured this trend unambiguously 
 
  
                                                             
 
37 The other two are: developing country and great power. 
Victimization is not only prominent in China; for the discourse has been actively promoted by various 
societal and political groups in Japan as well (Jeans 2005). 
49 
 
 “Since the 1990s, the discourse surrounding the War of Resistance has shifted away from the 
place of Japanese imperialism in the temporal narrative of liberation and nation-state building 
toward an obsessive attention to China’s victimization at the hands of the Japanese; tragic tales of 
horror are displacing, though by no means replacing, the heroic narrative of resistance” (Denton 
2007). 
 
Therefore, the dominant discourse on humiliation by prioritizing the ‘not-forgetting’ of China’ 
victimhood of silenced other aspects in the discourse, such as an analysis of why such 
humiliations were happened in the first place (Cohen 2002:20-22).  By blaming China’s 
humiliations and sufferings on the foreign countries exclusively, the calamities Chinese brought 
upon themselves, such as during the Taiping rebellion or the Cultural Revolution are simply 
silenced and omitted in the discourse.38  
 
The narrative of victimhood was evoked in Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 15th National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China of 1997. His speech began with the description of the modern 
Chinese history full of China’s humiliations suffered by Western powers and Japan. Therefore, 
according to Jiang the future task of the CCP and China is to prevent further victimisations at the 
hands of foreign powers in the future and to build a strong and prosperous nation (Jiang 1997). 
More recently, Hu Jintao in a speech about the future of the PLA noted the aggressive intentions 
of the Western countries towards China and warned that “Western hostile forces have not given 
up the wild ambition of trying to subjugate us, intensifying the political strategy of Westernizing 
and dividing up China” (Hu 2004). Even more recently, Xi Jinping in 2009 as Vice-President 
accessed foreigners of interfering into China’s affairs "Some foreigners with full bellies and 
nothing better to do engage in finger-pointing at us [China]" (The Strait Times 14/2/2009).  
 
The emergence of the discourse of victimisation perhaps answers the confusion of analysts who 
wondered why in the 2000s a country aspiring to become a global leader would keep 
emphasizing its past injustices (Schell 2008). They have been  
  
                                                             
 
38 In 2006, the Freezing Point, a state-run Chinese magazine was shut down after publishing an article 
by a university professor Yuan Weishi, which accused the government of teaching incomplete history 
and promoting excessive nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment, for example on the causes and events 
in the Second Opium War (The Washington Post 25/1/2006).  
The English translation of his article is available online at : 
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20060126_1.htm Moreover, the essay elicited a strongly negative reaction 
on the Chinese Internet; Yuan was repeatedly called a “traitor”.  
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puzzled why the government continues to remind people of the former humiliations. As China 
takes an increasingly greater role in international affairs, is emphasizing past weaknesses a way 
to future greatness? Scholars have explored the impact of memories of humiliation on 
contemporary China; Kaufmann argued that “Chinese elites today draw on the “Century of 
Humiliation” (1839–1949) as a starting point for their views on how China should interact with 
other nations.” (Kaufmann 2010: 1). Similarly, Gries noted that victimisation has become a 
fundamental theme in China’s collective identity; he put it, “The West is central to the 
construction of China’s identity today; it has become China’s alter ego” (Gries quoted in Schell 
2008).  
 
4.4.1 The Othering of Japan 
Victimisation as a form of collective identity is always about the sharpening of the distinction 
between the inside and the outside. As discussed in detail in chapter 2, the practice of Othering or 
emphasizing the different discovered in the Other as a threat to the Self could lead to conflict and 
the legitimation of inter-group violence. While these distinctions are always present, sometimes 
they are sharper and more visible. Anti-foreignism was an important part in shaping China’s 
national consciousness in the late 19
th
 century, where the Chinese began to distinguish between 
themselves and the foreigners at the basis of nation and state. Similarly, in the process of identity 
reconstruction in China since the 1990s China was increasingly presented as a victim of Western 
and particularly Japanese aggression. The previous ‘victor’ narrative that dominated in the public 
discourse in China after the founding of the PRC was gradually supplanted by a new narrative 
that emphasized the injustices China suffered, especially at the hands of Japan (Gries 2004, He 
2009, Wang 2012).  
 
Resisting Japan has been a long-standing theme of the CCP leadership and could be traced back 
to the year 1921 when the Party was founded.39 However, the theme of resistance against Japan 
has been increasingly used since the Reform era, particularly since the 1990s (Hughes 2008). As 
Denton argued, this discourse has an important political role: “depictions of Japanese atrocities 
are morally unambiguous and serve to direct divisive class resentments toward an external other; 
national unity and shared national sentiment grow out of this ‘othering’ of Japan, “as he pointed 
out  
  
                                                             
 
39 The national anthem of China was originally an anti-Japanese song. 
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during the time “when China’s economy and culture increasingly merged with the global and its 
identity became murkier, “(Denton 2007: 248). A Japanese scholar further noted that the Chinese 
perceptions of Japan became more negative since the end of the Cold War and particularly since 
the mid-1990s (Kobayashi 2008: 89 in Wu 2012: 52). 
 
The shift in perception and deterioration of relations came at a time of uncertain national identity 
when Chinese leaders were trying to reinvent China after 1989. Previously, Japan was lionized as 
an example for China during the transition from socialism to capitalism, and was particularly 
praised for its hybrid system of capitalism and socialism. According to a 1987 survey reported by 
a Shanghai journal, the highest amount of respondents chose Japan as the foreign country with 
the best reputation, which testifies to the prominence Japan enjoyed at that time (Rozman 
2002:98).  
 
Nevertheless, since 1993 and particularly since the 1997 financial crisis, Japan ceased to be a role 
model and China did not want to learn from Japan anymore. It was seen not only in the official 
discourse, but also in a general downturn of public opinion towards Japan. Rozman quoted a 
1997 report of the 1996 survey of young people feelings about Japan where only 15% had good 
feelings about Japan, which testifies to a dramatic deterioration in perceptions of Japan in China 
(Ibid.). Officials reinforced the image of China as a victim of Japan after 1989 particularly 
through patriotic education. In the popular culture, Chinese media and cinema industry fostered a 
negative image of Japan; for example the popularity of Japanese TV shows declined dramatically 
(Rozman 2002: 116). Moreover, the grass-roots campaign demanding reparations from Japan has 
become strong again and is more prominently featured in the media particularly on the Internet.40  
 
Moreover, China has been very anxious about Tokyo’s apparent post-Cold War great power 
ambitions and a potential return of Japanese militarism, which China perceives Japan’s behaviour 
through the lens of past humiliations. Chinese have been also sensitive to Japanese ‘China threat’ 
theories, which they see as carefully manipulated to justify increases in military expenditures and 
a closer alliance with  
  
                                                             
 
40 For example, when Japan tried to make a bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council 
in 2005, a Chinese grass-roots campaign opposing Japan’s membership boosted at least 22 million 
signatures in China (The New York Times, 1 April 2005).  
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the United States to bully China (Deng 2008:190). Moreover, the Chinese fear that by pointing 
finger to China first, Japan would be absolved of the War responsibility, which is a part of larger 
anti-China plan. For example, a 2005 China Daily commentary maintained that “Japan has tried 
every means to disseminate the idea of a "threat" from China's military build-up,” and went on to 
argue that Japan’s “desire to abandon its post-war path of peaceful development to pursue 
political and military power has become increasingly strong” (Xinhua 11/4/2005). Japan’s 
aloofness and lack of sensitivity and respect for China was echoed in a comment made by 
prominent Chinese scholar Liu Jiangyong who admonished Japan for ”despising, discriminating 
against, and even disregarding its Asian neighbours” (Liu 2006:8). 
 
Undoubtedly, Japanese themselves have been active actors in reinforcing the ‘Othering’ of Japan 
in China and done not enough to assure China of taking full responsibility and contrition for the 
past and recognizing China’s current situation. Recurring themes in Japan such as history 
textbook revisions and visits of politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine only add insult to injury and 
confirm the image of Japan as wanting to hurt China, which was particularly pronounced during 
the Koizumi era (2001-2006). Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines were received 
with great anxiety in China. A newspaper editorial titled “Japan’s military ambition” harshly 
criticized Japan’s policy, and while describing China as a “peace-loving nation that adheres to 
peaceful development,” accused Japan of abusing the “China threat” theory to augment its 
military build-up and warned of Japanese militarism (China Daily 20/12/2010). The discourse of 
danger juxtaposed the antagonistic Japan and victimized China who is the target and scapegoat 
for Japan’s aggression. Japan due to its construction in China and its own behavior became one of 
the main Others in China’s national identity construction and augmented China’s victim identity 
in international relations. According to a joint Sino-Japanese opinion poll conducted in 1997, 86% 
of Chinese considered Japan’s War compensations as inadequate, 745 believed that Japan should 
show contrition and only 20% would choose “constructing a new cooperative relationship 
unconstrained by past” (‘Japan-China society of media studies’ quoted in He 2009: 252). 
 




2, represents the changes in China’s identity and the role of the Other Japan played in this 
construction. As follows from the table, China’s identity became increasingly exclusive and less 
able to accommodate difference discovered in Japan. Moreover, Japan’s active resistance to 
China’s narratives made China even more insecure, as it challenged China’s construction as the 
victim of Japan. The resulting ontological insecurity only generated a greater necessity for China 
to reinstate its identity by representing Japan as the oppressor of China. Also, the renegotiation of 
China’s identity decreases the level of affinity between China and Japan Self and Other, 
rendering it much easier to dehumanize Japan and present is as a threat to China. The resulting 
relationship of ‘Othering’, when Japan was represented as a threat to China is translated into 
insecurity in the Sino-Japanese relations. As the levels of trust decrease, the threat perception 
between China and Japan increases and brings China and Japan to the Hobbesian culture of 
anarchy (Wendt 1999) where they see each other as enemies and act as if driven by fear of death. 
The lack of China’s ontological security has behavioural implications for its relationship with 
Japan. It increases the potential for conflict between China and Japan and could serve as the 




Figure 4:  The role of Japan as the ‘other’ in China’s post-1989 identity formation: the constitutive dimensions of self/other interaction41 
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41 (taken from Rumelili 2004-my own representation) 
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4.4.2 The persistence of China’s victim identity in the new millennium 
 
China’s victim identity that again came to prominence in the 1990s continued to impact China 
and its foreign relations also in the next decade. In the narrative of China’s victimhood is deeply 
rooted in the historical experience of disrespect and victimization at the hands of Western nations 
and Japan. Writing in 2008, Chinese scholar captured the continuing prevalence of this mentality 
among the Chinese elites: ”what is indeed striking is the extent to which the Chinese elites 
attribute their country’s foreign policy predicament to how it is mistrusted and mistreated”(Deng 
2008: 10). The events surrounding the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing and the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games point to the continuing relevance of China’s victim identity in foreign relations.  
 
In 1999 during the conflict in Yugoslavia, United States aircraft inadvertently bombed the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade killing three Chinese nationals, which led to serious diplomatic 
crisis between the two countries. The incident not only led to massive demonstrations in China, 
but a reject of official American apology to China. The Chinese believed that the attack was 
intentional and they understood the incident through the prism of victim identity as a deliberate 
act, but also a part of a plot of the United States to undermine China (Hess 2010: 49). Chinese 
state media made the parallel between after the bombing of the embassy between the current US 




 centuries. An editorial in the China 
Daily made the comparison between the 1999 bombing and the 1899 Eight Nation Alliance 
invasion as a symbol of foreign oppression (Wang 2012: 183). 
 
Moreover, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games not only presented the success of China’s economic 
reforms, but also pointed to China’s continuing insecurities vis-a-vis the international society. 
China also aspired to host the 2004 games, but after narrowly losing to Sydney, the Chinese were 
convinced that the Western powers and particularly the United States worked to thwart China’s 
bid.  
 
Prior to the 2008 Games, a series of violence erupted in Tibet following demonstrations in the 
capital city, Lhasa. The subsequent repression of protests led to international condemnations and 




As a consequence, the Olympic torch relay was interrupted by pro-Tibetan activists in both Paris 
and London. As a response, the Chinese government promoted a counter narrative of “Tibetan 
separatists and some people with ulterior motives disrupted the Olympic torch relay in London 
and Paris” (China Daily, 4/11/2008). Moreover, the Western press was accused of “biased media 
coverage” of both the protest in Lhasa and the Olympic Games and the politicians in the United 
States were accused of “double standards” in foreign policy [towards China] and their arrogance 
and lack of respect for the other people in the world (China Daily, 21/4/2008). The Chinese 
believed that the campaign was orchestrated by the West to humiliate China before the 2008 
Olympic Games. The Games were a symbol of ‘rejuvenation’ for China and a way to overcome 
the ‘sick man of Asia syndrome’. Hence the obsession with winning as many gold medals as 
possible, while ignoring the silver and bronze medals won: only a victory in the Olympic Games 
would wipe away this national humiliation.  
 
In general, despite decades of rapid economic growth, China still faces huge economic and 
political uncertainties. Rapid economic growth in the last decades created huge social, economic 
and political tensions in contemporary China. Moreover, a year after the protests in Tibet, 
tensions broke out in Xinjiang in 2009, which created further domestic instability. This has 
exacerbated the pressures on the Chinese government, which is now even more anxious to meet 
the various domestic and international challenges. Moreover, according to the China watchers, in 
the recent years as their leadership tenure was going to an end, the Hu-Wen was in a very weak 
position and very nervous (Zhao 2013). Therefore, Chinese domestic and international 
insecurities have not lessened, but arguably became even more severe. Despite the calls of 
Chinese intellectuals such as Zi Zhongyun to abandon using the “excuse of ‘five thousand years 
of civilization plus one hundred years of humiliation’ “, but in the 21
st
 century China should 
rather strive to “create new spiritual sources of inspiration” (Zi quoted in Deng 2008:51).China’s 
victim identity, which again came to prominence after the end of the Cold War and became 
embedded in China’s domestic political structure, is not likely to wither away. The following 




4.5 Locals of identity construction- China’s patriotic education 
The patriotic education has played an important role in the process of identity construction in 
China since 1989. History and its interpretations are inherently intertwined with a particular 
identity, on the individual as well as collective level. Constructing the past is therefore an act of 
self-identification with political implications. More than merely an academic exercise, “making 
history is a way of producing identity insofar as it produces a relation between that which 
supposedly occurred in the past and the present state of affairs” (Friedman 1992: 837). 
 
Patriotic education establishes an artificial sameness in China’s history and foreign relations over 
time by a particular recollection of the past, which is necessary for the stability of identity 
construction in the post-1989 China. Friedman argued that the “construction of a history is the 
construction of a meaningful universe of events and narratives for an individual or collectively 
defined subject” (Ibid: 837). The Self needs to be set in and stabilized by a series of narratives 
that enable the temporal stability of the Self, which is a particular construction of national 
subjectivity, such as China as a socialist country, China as a victim of Japanese oppression, etc. 
Narratives of history thus provide important epistemological resources to confirm and reproduce 
a particular identity.  
 
Therefore, patriotic education plays such an important role in contemporary China in enacting a 
particular construction of the Chinese Self and the foreign Other, which provide the basis of 
China’s national identity. Also, the patriotic education through the educational process effectively 
silences and marginalizes any other voices within the society that might challenge the official 
historical narrative. Scholars have observed a strong link between the patriotic education and the 
nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese since mid-1990s (Zhao 1998), which would also shape 
China’s foreign relations, especially with Japan (He 2007, Wang 2008). 
 
In September 1989 Deng Xiaoping reflected on his leadership and domestic affairs in China by 
saying that the “gravest failure has been in education- we did not provide enough education to 
young people, including students. We can curb inflation quickly, but it is much more difficult to 
make up for lost education.” (People’s Daily, 19/9/1989). In his speech Deng linked the absence 




political and ideological education] for students to the events of 1989. Therefore, to prevent any 
future upheavals, Deng thought that the students needed to be educated to love the country and 
the CCP. Chinese government pushed for patriotism, which conflated the love of China with the 
love for the Party as opposed to keeping the distinction alive. Patriotism was mobilized to fill in 
the ideological void in the post-1989 China. Upon examining 19 political education-related 
policy documents concerning the patriotic education curriculum reform, Fairbrother argued that 
patriotic education in the society serves multiple functions in contemporary China. Firstly, it 
contributes to the maintenance of territorial integrity, national unity and national pride. Second, it 
transports knowledge and attitudes on China’s international relations. Thirdly, patriotic education 
helps to maintain the socialist system in China and boost government legitimacy (Fairbrother 
2002: 93). 
 
4.5.1 Beginning of the campaign- the official structure 
In 1991 the patriotic education campaign was formally institutionalized but it did not start in 
practice until 1994 when it was massively implemented throughout China. The target of the 
campaign were the young people who were to study Chinese history and the humiliations China 
suffered and how has the country benefited from the leadership of the CCP. One of the key 
documents that institutionalised the patriotic education was the “Outline on the implementation 
of patriotic education” published by the Central Committee of the CCP in 1994. It gave the 
following description of the Chinese history as the foundation of the patriotic education.   
 
“Chinese modern history is a history of humiliation in which china gradually degenerated into a 
semi-colonial and semi-feudal society; at the same time, it is also a history that Chinese people 
strived for national independence and social progress and persisted in their struggle of 
anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. It is also the history of the success of the New-Democratic 
Revolution under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party” (quoted in Wang 2012:103). 
 
The patriotic education campaign was carried out in a very practical and sophisticated way and 
affected all schools from kindergarten to university level. Patriotic education was carried out in 
schools in Mainland China not only though the curriculum but also extracurricular activities, 
such as visits to museums and war memorials or screenings of patriotic films. Analysing the 




perspective of China’s foreign relations, another scholar argued that the main goals of the reform 
were to “educate Chinese people, especially the young people, about China’s humiliating 
experience in the face of Western and Japanese incursions” (Wang 2012: 96-97).  
 
4.5.2 The contents of patriotic education 
Students of patriotic education are taught about various social, economic and political issues, 
such as current national conditions and policies, including economic and political systems and 
policies, policy on reunification, nationalities policies, military affairs, foreign affairs, society, 
culture, population, and national resources and so on (Fairbrother 2002: 95). Nevertheless, the 
two dominant themes in the campaign, which are especially important for China’s foreign 
relations, are national history and culture as well as national unity and territorial integrity (Zhao 
1998: 296).  
 
Following the introduction of patriotic education, Chinese history broke with its tradition of 
focusing on the victory and achievements of the CCP, but rather depicted history as a series of 
struggles against foreign aggression and the pivotal role of the CCP in the resistance against 
imperialism. Likewise, through the patriotic education campaign, Confucianism and Chinese 
cultural traditions likewise experienced a revival. Interpretations of history abandoned 
Marxism-Leninism and class struggles, which was originally employed in the communist 
historiography to explain the Western imperialism and the Civil War. Rather, the new focus was 
on the national rather than class component of these conflicts. Wang calls this a shift from the 
“class struggle narrative” to the “patriotic narrative” (Wang 2008: 791). Another scholar 
maintained that “Unlike its previous emphasis on class struggle and CCP–KMT confrontation, 
the new history education curriculum centered on the conflicts between the Chinese nation and 
those foreign nations that invaded China in the past, especially Japan, so that it could inspire the 
people to redeem past humiliations and restore national glory.” (He 2007:7). According to Jones, 
the history education content was recast in ‘purely ideological terms’, which highlighted China’s 
“glorious (pre-modern) cultural history and superiority over contemporary civilizations, and 




incompetence and ossified thinking on the part of China’s feudal rulers had brought China to a 
nadir from which the nation could never have recovered without the CPC.” (Jones 2002:560).  
 
Second Sino-Japanese War 
The Sino-Japanese war featured more prominently in the new curriculum and particularly Japan 
was portrayed in much more negative light. The official historiography started paying more 
attention to events such as the Second Sino-Japanese War and the injustices and humiliation 
China suffered from Japan.  The previous school curriculum ignored Japanese atrocities 
committed in China and according to Reilly played a “surprisingly minor role in the wartime 
history depicted in current Chinese high school and college textbooks” (Reilly 2004: 279). 
Instead of suffering, the textbooks emphasized the heroic resistance of the Chinese (Communist) 
soldiers. Reilly quoted a textbook from Hunan province, which is in his view representative of 
the scholarship and in its discussion of the Second Sino-Japanese War: “Japanese imperialism 
started the war of invasion against China, bringing heretofore unseen disasters to the Chinese 
people…but the Chinese people’s heroic resistance, at great cost, led to the eventual 
victory…with a great contribution to the global anti-imperialist struggle” (Ibid:279). The new 
portrayal of Japan challenges the older image of a small clique of (capitalist) warmongers 
conspiring to bring China and Japan on the collision course. Likewise, the responsibility for the 
war and the damage lies not with the Japanese people, who were likewise victims of the 
capitalists.  
 
In his article titled ‘China's “New Remembering” of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–
1945’, Coble mapped how Chinese official historiography has mapped the conflict. Despite its 
devastating nature, over 20 million casualties and around 100 million refugees, the memory of 
the war was supressed in China. As he put it: ”a visit to China in Mao’s day would have given no 
hint of the magnitude of this conflict” (Coble 2007: 395). Another reason for the renewed 
attention to the war is the change of attitude towards Taiwan and the ambition for its reunification 
with the mainland. Coble emphasized another theme that dominated the recent historiography on 




the meticulous coverage of the atrocities carried out by Japanese troops during the war. 
Especially the emphasis on not forgetting the past humiliations (wuwang guochi) trickles through 
the contemporary narrative on the war. Similarly as Gries observed, the suffering of the Chinese 
people has been emphasised. While previously the number of casualties stood around 9 million, 
Jiang Zemin elevated the number to 35 million, which now stands as the official figure (Gries 
2004: 80). Similarly, there has been a boom in new scholarship on the Sino-Japanese war; one 
scholar estimated that as of 2007, there were hundreds of publications in China (Coble 
2007:405-406).  
 
4.6 Locals of identity construction- Public sites and monuments of the post-1989 
China 
Alongside school textbooks, public sites and memorials are another important local of identity 
construction in China, which are significant for the understanding of Sino-Japanese relations. The 
museums help to propagate an identity narrative to a wider audience, they do not only reflect on 
the Chinese history but they also shape the understandings of the world of Chinese people today. 
And by examining the exhibitions we can capture the changing and evolving views China holds 
of its past, particularly concerning some sensitive events in the past. Mitter noted that 
“institutions such as the Nanjing Massacre Museum show how deeply the Massacre has helped to 
bolster the part of China's self-image that is rooted in victimhood in the political culture of the 
1990s.” (Mitter 2003: 122).  
 
Museums and public monuments have played a role in the discourse of victimisation in the 
post-1989 China. According to one scholar, monuments such as the Yuanming Gardens and the 
Dagu Forts help to keep the imaginary of national humiliation alive and they help us understand 
the contemporary memory of war in China (Hevia 2007).42 Through their exhibitions, they 
present a shift in the collective memories from class struggles which emphasized the victorious 
cadres to a much darker portrayal of Chinese history. Parallel to the representations of China, its 
history and particularly relations with Japan, similar representations can be found in the museums 
around China. Denton argued “there has been a general trend in such representations toward an 
emphasis on atrocity and victimization and away from  
  
                                                             
 
42 The Dagu Forts were a place of battle during the Boxer rebellion between the Chinese and allied 
Western and Japanese forces and ended in a Western victory.  
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the narratives of heroic resistance that dominated in the Mao era.” (Denton 2007).  
 
Since 1989, the number of history museums in China commemorating the Second Sino-Japanese 
War increased dramatically. The Memorial Hall of the People’s War of Resistance Against Japan 
(Zhongguo renmin kangri zhanzheng jinianguan), Memorial to Victims of the Nanjing Massacre 
by Japanese Invaders (QinHua Rijun Nanjing datusha yunan tongbao jinianguan), Crime 
Evidence Exhibition Hall of Japanese Imperial Army Unit 731 (QinHua Rijun di qisanyao budui 
zuizheng chenlieguan), and September 18 History Museum (Jiuyiba lishi bowuguan), which were 
established in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly to the school textbooks, the museums mushroomed 
only after a relaxation of research on sensitive events in Sino-Japanese history, such as the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. Since 1991, Chinese government put great effort into constructing 
these memorials: over 100 were declared national-level patriotic bases, in the form of memorials, 
museums or monuments, and more importantly, half of them are dedicated to the Anti-Japanese 
War. For example, the Memorial Hall for the victims in Nanjing Massacre was built in 1988 but it 
was renovated in 1995.  
 
These museums link lost territory to the suffering of the Chinese to the present day domestic and 
international situation. After the founding of the PRC, memorials were built for the heroic 
resistance and not to commemorate the victims (Reilly 2004: 278). Nevertheless, analysts have 
highlighted the role which history plays in the portrayal of China as a victim of Western and 
Japanese aggression (Renwick and Cao 1999, Wang 2012).  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
As examined in detail in this chapter, the post-Cold War period was a ‘formative moment’ for 
China, when it began to search for new identities that would define the 21
st
 century China. 
Nevertheless, the rapid and often incoherent development China experienced since the ‘open 
door policy’ exacerbated the feelings of ontological insecurity. Following 1989 Tiananmen 
Square events China was sanctioned and was reduced to a position of pariah in the international 
society, which further aggravated the feelings of oppression and humiliation (Shih 2003). Thus, 




demise of socialism in China, the legitimacy crises of the government and the ambiguities of 
China itself in the early 1990s, China descended into a state an identity crisis. To fill in the 
ideational gap both the government and the intellectuals embraced the idea of a strong state to 
reinvent China. As opposed to the 1980s, these new ideas did not look to the West and Japan for 
inspiration, but rather emphasized and mobilized the richness of China’s philosophical traditions.  
 
Nevertheless, this quest for new greatness opened up the wounds of the past. As one observer 
noted that “China’s restless search for a more self-confident, less-aggrieved persona has 
paradoxically been made more complicated by other wounds not directly related to foreign 
attacks, for much of the past hundred years Chinese themselves have also been engaged in a 
series of assaults on their own culture and history” (Schell 2008). The shift from praising West 
and Japan as role models for China and their critical re-evaluations led to their increasingly 
negative portrayals. Therefore, as a part of the discursive construction of China following 1989, a 
much prominent role was given to the injustices that happened to China during the Century of 
humiliation. In this discursive construction, China was depicted as the victim of Western and 
particularly Japanese oppression.  
This discourse highlighted the humiliations and defeats suffered from the foreigners, but ignored 
the calamities Chinese brought upon by themselves. The self-other dialectic has been recalibrated 
from class to national dimension- no longer the communist self against the nationalist (capitalist) 
other, but rather the national (Chinese) self against the foreign other. In this dichotomous 
construction, Japan occupies a place at the end of spectrum, as the most brutal and oppressive of 
the foreign invaders, against which the Chinese Self has been juxtaposed. Through patriotic 
education and public monuments a new narrative of victimisation has reached dominance in 
China.  
 
The following chapter builds upon this chapter’s work and examine how China’s ‘victimized’ 
identity impacts on China’s relations with Japan, particularly as to related to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands dispute. Building upon the work of other scholars, the chapter reconsiders Sino-Japanese 




(Suzuki 2007) and accounts for China’s evolving policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  
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Chapter 5: China’s foreign policy 
towards Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
The territorial dispute between China and Japan revolves around the contested Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands. The islands are located in the East China Sea between China and Japan, 230 nautical 
miles east of the Chinese mainland and 200 nautical miles southwest of Japan’s Okinawa. The 
total territory of the 5 islands is 7 square kilometres. United States served as the islands' 
custodian from the end of the Second World War; however, in 1972 it returned the administrative 
rights over the islands to Japan. The sovereignty of the islands has been one of the most contested 
issues in Sino-Japanese relations since that time. The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are also claimed by 
the Republic of China (Taiwan), however since it is outside the scope of this thesis, the role of 
Taiwan in the on-going dispute is not discussed. Even though Japan’s official position is that 
there is no dispute and Japanese politicians regularly deny the existence of any dispute, the 
islands have been disputed since the late 1960s and in recent years significantly impacted on 
Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
Given the importance of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute not only for the bilateral relations, 
but also for the East Asian security, there has been a growth in the English language political 
science literature on the issue. Book length monographs by political scientists have analysed 
either territorial disputes in East Asia or focused on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in specific terms 
(Chung 2004, Koo 2009, Suganuma 2000). Some scholars (Downs and Saunders 1998, Deans 
2000) argued that the elites in China manipulated domestic nationalism over this issue to gain 
concessions in Sino-Japanese relations. Other scholars such as Koo (2009) and Liao (2008) 
emphasized the economic dimension of the dispute. Koo argued that economic interdependence 
has helped repeatedly to deescalate the conflict over the disputed islands. Others provided 
detailed empirical accounts of historical or contemporary events in the dispute (Valencia 2007, 
Drifte 2008). With the current heightened nature of the dispute, the literature on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is only expected to burgeon.  
 
Justification for the research topic  
There are many contested issues in the Sino-Japanese relations, such as the visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine by Japanese politicians and disagreements over interpretations of sensitive historical 




the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is arguably the most difficult nut to crack as it could be 
plausibly accounted for by both realist and constructivist theories. A justification for this 
particular case study and a particular event in time, the 2010 boat collision incident, is therefore 
necessary.  
 
Firstly, as Forsberg noted, territorial disputes represent an important test field for theories in 
International Relations. Therefore, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute represents a ‘hard case’ 
for any IR theory. Even more so, territory has been always considered a prime materialist concept 
and traditionally accounted for in the security studies literature as a result of the power struggles, 
and therefore the realist theories would be expected to perform best in accounting for territorial 
disputes (Forsberg 2003:10). Thus if a constructivist analysis could convincingly account for the 
ideational value of territories as well as territorial behaviour in terms of identities, then they 
would become convincing explanatory factors. Therefore the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute 
and China’s policy towards the islands, are not only one of the most important issues in China’s 
foreign relations, but also they would be the critical test of any theoretical paradigm attempting to 
explain international relations. Moreover, Nippon Research Centre opinion polls conducted in 
China in 2005 and 2007 confirmed that the Chinese perceive the territorial disputes as a 
significant obstacle in Sino-Japanese relations. 50,6 and 47,1 per cent of respondents, 
respectively, who claimed they have no affinity for Japan, cited the unresolved territorial disputes 
as one of the reasons (Nippon Research Centre, 26/11/2007).43 
 
Secondly, this thesis focuses on the 2010 boat collision incident, because it was the immediate 
intellectual motivation for this research project. The incident was arguably the most serious issue 
in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the Koizumi era in Japan, and therefore a very 
important development in the bilateral relations. Moreover, China’s Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
policy and its response to the 2010 incident are a prime example of the effect of the ‘victimized’ 
identity on China’s foreign policy. Therefore, the focus on the 2010 incident not only contributes 
to the scholarship on the Sino-Japanese relations by covering the latest developments in the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute, which has not been covered in IR  
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scholarship.44 More importantly, it applies the identity perspective to account for China’s policy 
towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and therefore makes a novel contribution to scholarship.  
 
5.1 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute summary  
Historical background 
The territorial dispute effectively started in 1968 when a United Nations research team revealed 
that the waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands might contain rich hydrocarbon resources. 
Following the report, PRC, ROC as well as Japan made strong public claims about the 
sovereignty of the islands. The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands became a heated issue again in 1972 and 
1978 during the period of Sino-Japanese reconciliation. Nevertheless, both China and Japan 
agreed to shelve the dispute and did not deem its persistence as a significant obstacle to the 
improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. The islands remained unoccupied, apart from occasional 
visits by Japanese fishermen, but nominally were owned by a Japanese family. In 1990, the 
dispute inflamed again after Japan was preparing to recognize a lighthouse built on the islands by 
Japanese right-wing activists two years before. In 1996 a group of Japanese right-wing activists 
landed on the islands and built another lighthouse. In the same year, a Hong Kong activist 
drowned when attempting to land on the islands. Protests took place in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
against the Japanese behaviour; however, there were no large scale protests in China.  
 
During the 2000s, the dispute further escalated with frequent attempts usually unsuccessful by 
Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese activists to land on the islands. Moreover, China continued 
to raise its physical presence in the area by dispatching both scientific and maritime police 
vessels to the waters surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. In 2008 and 2010 Taiwanese and 
Chinese vessels were arrested by Japanese Coast Guard near the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. 
Especially, the 2010 boat collision incident precipitated a major diplomatic spat between China 
and Japan, and elicited a heated and forceful reaction both from China’s government and the 
public. Moreover, in 2012 following Japan’s proclaimed intention to nationalize the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Large-scale demonstrations took place in many Chinese  
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cities which drew large crowds and were also comprehensively reported by the international 
media. Therefore while the dispute was always a contested issue in Sino-Japanese relations, since 
the 2010 boat collision incident the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute has taken on a higher 
international profile and it has drawn increasing attention of Western observers.  
 
Competing positions and claims 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is complicated because it is not a single, but rather a 
multifaceted and complex issue connected to other difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations. The 
dispute pertains to history, sovereignty, identity, security as well as unresolved demarcation 
boundaries in the East China Sea, all of which are closely connected and often go beyond 
Sino-Japanese relations. Both China and Japan base their sovereignty claims to the islands on 
historical sources and legal documents. 
 
Japan insists that when incorporated in 1895, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands had already been 
discovered by Japan 10 years earlier. More importantly from the perspective of international law, 
Japan maintains that when incorporated, the islands were terra nullius, belonged to nobody and 
therefore could not be claimed by any other country. Japan also argues that the incorporation and 
the legal status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are not linked to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and 
therefore independent of the return of Taiwan as stipulated in various international World War 
Two treaties. Therefore, Japan claims “there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be 
resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands” (JMOFA, May 2013). 
 
On the other hand, China claims that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are an “inseparable part of the 





 centuries.45 The islands were used as navigation points for ships and later as a source of 
medical herbs. According to China, the islands have been under Chinese jurisdiction and even 
have been shown on both Chinese and Japanese historical maps as belonging to China. China 
argues that the Chinese discovered the islands first, centuries before Japan and that they were 
only “grabbed from China” following the First Sino-Japanese War and their subsequent 
occupation  
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was therefore “illegal and invalid” (SCIO, September 2012). Even though the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands were not included directly in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, The Treaty of San Francisco, or 
in other international treaties, nevertheless, China maintains that Japan was obliged to return all 
territories taken before World War Two.  
 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is further exacerbated by the stance of the United States 
who maintains no position on the sovereignty of the islands and claimed that the dispute must be 
resolved between China and Japan. United States argues that when returning the islands to Japan 
in 1971, merely the ‘administrative rights’ were returned. According to United States, the islands 
are still covered by the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty even though United States continues to 
make no judgements on the sovereignty of the islands. Nevertheless, until 1971 United States 
treated the islands as a part of Okinawa and favoured Japan’s claim to the islands ‘in both word 
and deed’ (Blanchard 2000:97).  
 
From a perspective of international law the dispute boils down to whether China or Japan has a 
better claim to the islands. The dispute, nevertheless, pertains not only to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands, but also to the demarcation of borders in the East China Sea. China and Japan apply 
different maritime demarcation principles to push their border claims, which would serve to their 
respective advantages. Therefore China champions the approach of natural prolongation of 
continental shelf, but Japan rather advocates the application of the equidistance approach. This 
thesis neither judges the strength of the respective legal claims in the light of the international 
law nor examines their historical and legal validity. Rather, this section sets the background for 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute that would help us understand current China’s policy towards 
the islands.  
 
China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands before 1989  
In 1972 and 1978, the issue of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands sovereignty was raised during the 
negotiations surrounding, respectively the Sino-Japanese normalisation of relations, and the 
signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty. Nevertheless, Chinese and Japanese leaders showed 




an important part of Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping famously suggested 
shelving the dispute for the moment and leaving it for the future generations to resolve.  
 
“Our two sides agreed not to touch upon this [Dioayu/Senkaku islands] question when diplomatic 
relations were normalised between China and Japan…It does not matter if this question is 
shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common 
language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will find a solution 
acceptable to all” (quoted in Suganuma 2000).  
 
Therefore, while the two sides still had different opinions on the islands, according to Drifte they 
avoided the issue by “agreeing to disagree for the time being” (Drifte 2008). Nevertheless, later 
when the dispute was inflamed again, both China and Japan denied that there was such an 
understanding.  
 
5.2 The value of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands  
The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute has gained in notoriety and has moved to the forefront of 
Sino-Japanese relations. Various arguments have been put forward why the disputed islands are 
so important for China and why the dispute remains such an obstacle in Sino-Japanese relations. 
Before turning to the identity-based explanation of China’s policy vis-a-vis the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands, which is based on the islands’ sentimental value in China, nevertheless, their economic 
and strategic value would be briefly examined. The inadequacies of these approaches would be 
identified and would pave the way for the constructivist identity-based account of China’s foreign 
policy towards the islands.  
 
5.2.1 Economic value 
Scholars have pointed to the economic value of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands which drives the 
Sino-Japanese rivalry over the islands. To begin with, the economic value of the islands 
themselves is negligible, the islands are barren and only the largest one is habitable. Due to their 
small size, the islands cannot really support a larger population. Nevertheless, while the islands 
themselves do not contain any valuable natural resources, the surrounding waters are tipped to 
contain rich hydrocarbon resources, such as oil and gas. The 1968 United Nations survey argued 




hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea are comparable to those of Saudi Arabia. Had China 
exercised sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku, it could claim an Exclusive Economic Zone in 
the surrounding waters as well. Given the China’s growing dependence on energy imports and 
the new urgency that the debate over energy security gained in China, China’s grasp of the 
valuable economic resources would be undoubtedly strengthened by occupying the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. One Chinese analyst emphasized the importance of proximity of the 
islands to China’s coastal cities, which are an important production base but have no natural 
resources (Guo 2010:9). Therefore, energy would not have to be transported from different parts 
of China and it would be closer and cheaper to transport from the East China Sea. While Japan’s 
energy consumption has stagnated,46 China’s has been rising steadily and therefore China’s has 
even stronger incentives to push the issue. Drifte quoted both Chinese and Japanese estimates of 
the amounts of hydrocarbon resources, which confirm the rich hydrocarbon resources located in 
the adjacent waters to the islands (Drifte 2008).  
 
Resource scarcity provides at the first glance a plausible account for territorial disputes. The 
economic value of the islands in the form of an Exclusive Economic Zone would present a 
plausible account for China’s desire to reclaim the islands in order to exploit the resources. 
Nevertheless, are the potential gains significant enough to justify China’s position and policy? If 
the legitimacy of the Chinese government dependent on improving the economic conditions of 
the Chinese people, then antagonizing one of its most important trading partners would certainly 
hinder this goal. For example, the 2010 and 2012 boat collision incidents not only affected 
political relations, but also the dispute has harmed economic bilateral relations. As a direct 
consequence of China’s harsh stance, some production areas, such as the automobile industry, 
experienced serious difficulties. Up to date, China’s hard and uncompromising position has 




                                                             
 
46 Japan’s energy imports increased temporarily following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami; Japanese 
government data proved that oil imports rose by 2% and LNG by 11.2% in 2012 (Reuters 23/1/2013). 
Nevertheless, in the long term, Japanese energy imports are likely to continue to decrease due to the 
decline of Japan’s economy. 
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5.2.2 Strategic value 
Many scholars have framed the territorial dispute largely in strategic terms (Emmers 2010). Pan 
claimed that the strategic position of the islands between China and Japan makes the islands 
special to both China’s and Japan’s national defences. Furthermore Pan argued that “should either 
China or Japan legally secured the sovereignty over the islands, they would grant their owner an 
advantage in military security with a prolonged and enlarged frontier, putting the other side into a 
disadvantaged position” (Pan 2007:71). During the time of escalating Sino-Japanese rivalry, 
which is the consequence of the rise of China and decline of Japan, the strategic value of the 
islands has increased exponentially. Even if they were not strategically as important in the late 
Cold War era, especially after the Sino-Soviet split and Sino-American rapprochement, their 
strategic value must have increased especially in the recent years in the wake of tensions with the 
United States and particularly Japan. 
 
However, given the small area of the islands, it is dubious whether or not it would be possible to 
establish a forward military base at the islands. Even if such a base was established, would that 
put China at any strategic advantage? Similarly, in the event of a military attack, would the 
possession of the islands improve China’s ability to defend itself from Japan or the United States? 
Even if in the present international context the value of the islands increased, it is far from certain 
whether or not the persistence to the claim enhances or jeopardizes the security of China. 
Moreover, scholars have questioned how the islands would enhance a military capability of either 
country. Gabe Maasaki, a Professor from the University of the Ryukyus, Japan estimated the 
strategic value of the islands as “negligible”. He quoted the small terrain of the islands, so any 
bases would be small and therefore militarily insignificant (O’Shea 2012: 172). Moreover, in 
general by taking such a hard line on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute, China paid a 
significant opportunity cost, which has resulted in a marked deterioration of Sino-Japanese 
relations and China’s security.  
 
China’s unyielding and stubborn position has led to a series of embarrassing diplomatic incidents, 
such as the 2010 boat collision incident, which undoubtedly undermined the image of China as a 
‘responsible stakeholder’ and also contradicts the vision of ‘harmonious world’, which China has 




China’s policy only fuels anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan, which helps right-wing groups in 
Japan to play on the ‘China threat’ theory, which would only worsen the threat perception and 
strengthen the security dilemma between China and Japan. In addition, by attaching such 
importance to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the government in China becomes vulnerable to the 
growth of popular sentiment, which is overwhelmingly anti-Japanese. Therefore, the autonomy of 
its foreign policy towards Japan would be eroded and Sino-Japanese relations would be affected 
adversely even more from popular sentiments (Suzuki 2007). 
 
All in all, China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands cannot be accounted for on rational 
grounds alone. The China’s current position, which gives very little space for any compromise 
thus renders it impossible to exploit the contested resources, either jointly with Japan or on its 
own, thereby, not only jeopardizing China’s energy security, but has also been hurting China’s 
economy. In conclusion, what is China maximizing when clinging to the islands? Japan’s military 
strength is technologically superior compared to China and is further corroborated by the US 
support, which is bound by a Security Treaty. Is it therefore viable to explain China’s behaviour 
as power maximization, which could be accounted for through the rational choice?  
 
5.3 China’s identity crisis and the sentimental value of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands  
States value territory for more than strategic or economic consequences. They also attach 
sentimental value to territories with particular historical or cultural significance (Buruma 2012). 
The value of a particular territory for state is never static, but rather evolves during time and 
depends on the political, social and cultural conditions. Claims to territory could be motivated by 
injustice- territories have been wrongfully taken away and therefore to reclaim them constitutes a 
‘national mission’ and cannot be compromised upon. Territory is likewise inherently linked to 
the questions of national identity. As Forsberg argued “creating the idea of spatial unity, teaching 
the boundaries and presenting visual maps with sharp lines and different colours underlines the 
cartographic background elements of state and national identity“(Forsberg 2003:14). Identity 




territorial disputes. Nevertheless, in such an analysis, the link between identity and land must be 
explained properly and how the link has been maintained or has changed over time. While during 
the Cold War, politicians were able to glance over the disputed islands, and leave them for the 
further generations to resolve, the symbolic value of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to China has not 
remained static, but has changed following 1989 during the period of China’s identity crisis.  
 
Since the 1990s as a response to changes in both domestic and international environments new 
narratives were constructed in China that defined what it meant to be Chinese, and impacted on 
China’s relations with other countries. These narratives or ‘constitutive stories’ that were actively 
promoted by the Chinese leadership differed dramatically from the previous forms of the 
communist discourse. These narratives were institutionalized into the patriotic education and 
public monuments around China. These stories China told about itself situated China into a 
particular time and space; they linked the achievements of the CCP in fighting against the 
Japanese oppressors and provided additional legitimacy for the government. The new narratives 
after 1989, particularly that of victimisation at the hands of Japan, also redefined China’s foreign 
relations. Rignmar called this discursive construction an ‘affective geography of friends and 
enemies’ (Ringmar 1996: 164). Enemies were described as countries that were defined as the 
opposite of China, which also served the purpose of confirming the identity of China, as you can 
only know who you are when you know who you are not. In the post-Cold War era, Japan 
became the significant Other against which the Chinese identity became redefined (Wirth 2009). 
 
Therefore, while in 1970, the interests in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were purely material, that is 
the discovery of hydrocarbon resources, there was little sentiment attached to the islands. 




islands became embedded in the victimisation narrative. The new narratives that came to 
dominate China emphasized not so much the achievements of the Chinese civilisations, but also 
the humiliations China suffered. Diaoyu/Senkaku played a key role in this new narrative, as a 
prime example of China’s humiliation at the hands of Japan and provided meanings of what 
China was and who the Chinese people were and who they were not. Chinese policy towards the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands can be therefore understood as a part of identity politics, giving the 
dispute a role in the process of Chinese national identity construction since the end of the Cold 
War.  
 
While the Chinese government was able to win the legitimacy for the narratives inside China 
where the citizens accepted these stories because the narratives tapped into the deep seated 
feelings of animosity against Japan. However, in the international area, Japan continued to 
challenge this self-description of the Chinese, which led to practices of ‘Othering’ and 
increasingly oppositional identities. Japan actively undermined and contradicted constitutive 
narratives told by the Chinese government about the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and thus 
denied the stories international recognition. The Japanese side continuously refuses to recognize 
Chinese claims and the Chinese positions to the islands, for example by maintaining that there is 
no dispute at all. According to Japan “there is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an 
inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based upon international law. 
Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of 
territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands” (JMOFA, April 2013). In 
all official documents, Japan has always described the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as ‘inherent part 
of the territory of Japan’ and therefore ruled out any possible room for compromise. For example, 
when a China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report from February 2013 portrayed Japan as 
“extremely provocative”, and “causing further escalation of the situation” (MOFA 2/2013), Japan 
responded by describing itself as a victim of China’s aggressive behaviour, and as a 
“peace-loving nation”, which “will continue to contribute to peace and prosperity in Asia” 
(JMOFA, 7/2/2013). 
 
5.4 China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands: from interests to 
identity 
As a consequence of its identity crisis, China redefined its relationship with Japan and Japan 
emerged as the main ‘Other’ in China’s identity formation. Invoking China’s identity is essential 
to grasp the value of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to China as well as China’s post-Cold War policy 
towards the islands. National identities are bound up with territory, which reinforces the ‘in group’ 




Generations of Chinese leaders were socialised into believing that China has a better claim to the 
islands and that they have always been a part of China. Individuals do not have to have a direct 
personal experience with the territory to become emotionally attached, that is done through state 
socialisation, such as through patriotic education. The injustices done to China will not be fully 
redressed until the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are returned to China.  
 
Therefore, the hardening of the China’s position and policy towards Japan is a reflection of its 
quest for an identity in the post-Cold War world. On February 25 1992 China passed the Law on 
Territorial Sea. Article 2 argued: “PRC's territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore 
islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, 
Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the 
People's Republic of China” (PRC, 25/2/1992). This was the first time that a law in China 
exclusively stipulated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a part of China. Since 1999 the Chinese 
government raised its presence in the area by dispatching scientific vessels and maritime police 
vessels to the islands (Pan 2007: 75). 
 
More recently, China’s White Paper on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands published in September 2012 
refers to the islands as an inherent territory of China. In fact the very title of the white paper reads 
“Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,” which emphasized the islands’ connection to the 
Chinese mainland. The White Paper called the Japanese occupation of the islands since 1895 
“illegal and invalid”. Moreover it claimed the islands should have been returned to China after 
the Second World War. Likewise the September 2012 nationalisation of the islands by Japan was 
condemned, which according to China “grossly violates China's territorial sovereignty and 
seriously tramples on historical facts and international jurisprudence” (SCIO, 9/2012). Moreover, 
according to the White Paper, the United States illegally included the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 
its trusteeship and Japan’s claim over the sovereignty of the islands is likewise ‘totally 
unfounded’. The White Paper corroborated and built upon the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone, which unequivocally prescribed that Taiwan together with the affiliated 





nation’ which has the determination ‘to uphold China's state sovereignty and territorial integrity’. 
A Xinhua commentary described the nationalisation of islands as ‘theft’ (Xinhua, 24/9/2012), 
emphasizing the connection between the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and China. The White Paper 
thus discursively linked the history of Japanese oppression of China to the current Sino-Japanese 
relations 
 
5.5 China’s response to the 2010 boat collision incident  
The importance of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in China’s identity construction has been 
established in the previous paragraphs. This section will discuss the 2010 boat collision incident 
and examine China’s policy and its handling of the incident. I will discuss the incident itself- how 
it evolved into a serious diplomatic crisis with major repercussions for Sino-Japanese relations, 
but rather than being considered as a nuisance that could be quickly resolved. The underlying 
claim of this logic is that there are no objective incidents or crises to be discovered by state 
officials, rather state officials through their actions actively contribute to the production of events 
(Weldes 1999). This line of reasoning supports the broader meta-theoretical claim of this research 
that reality does not present to states unproblematically but rather through the subjective 
understanding of the world filtered through historical experience. The 2010 boat collision 
incident enabled the reconstruction of China’s identity as a victim and Japan as the aggressor 
disrupting peace and stability in Asia. A strong reaction by China was therefore obvious and 
justified, such as the postponement of bilateral meetings (China Daily 23/9/2010), to prevent 
Japan from further bullying China.  
 
5.5.1 The events of the 2010 boat collision Incident 
On 7 September 2010, a Japanese Coast Guard vessel found a Chinese fishing trawler 12 
kilometres north-west of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The Japanese ship requested that the 
Chinese boat leave the area, which is administered by Japan. Nevertheless the Chinese fishing 
trawler not only ignored the requests but also reportedly tried to crash into the Japanese coast 
guard ship. Nevertheless, in the end the Chinese fishing boat was finally boarded by the Japanese 
coast guard and the 14 crew members were arrested and the captain of the trawler was charged by 




Sino-Japanese political and economic ties. The issue became top news item in both China and 
Japan and captured the attention of civil society in both countries. Demonstrations in China grew 
especially violent and often resulted in damage to Japanese companies or brands. These 
developments coincided with the anniversary day of the Mukden Incident and the Japanese 
invasion of China on September 18 in 1931, which only aggravated the already sensitive 
atmosphere.  
 
China responded to the arrest of the fishing boat crew by both by word and deed. On 7 September, 
on the very day of the incident, China lodged an official diplomatic protest and summoned the 
Japanese Ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa. Again on September 9, Assistant Foreign Minister 
Hu Zhengyue summoned the Japanese Ambassador to lodge another formal protest. The 
detention of the captain was labelled a “protruding obstacle” in the Sino-Japanese ties by a 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson. China called the arrest an illegal detention and demanded that the 
Japanese side immediately release the ship and crew members on board as well as restated its 
claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  
 
As a result of the incident, China cancelled some economic transactions and tourist trips to Japan. 
The trawler and its crew were released on September 13. On September 19, the period of 
detention for the boat captain Zhan Qixiong was extended for 10 more days, which was again 
met with a strong reaction from China. The captain was released and returned to China on 
September 24, 2010. Nevertheless, even after Japan released the captain, Chinese demands did 
not stop, on September 25, Beijing demanded an apology from Japan as well as compensation for 
the damage of the Chinese fishing trawler. Moreover, a halt in the export of rare earth metals to 
Japan occurred during the rise of tensions between China and Japan from September 23 to 
November 13, 2010.  
 
According to the New York Times, the incident set the tensions between China and Japan to the 
highest point since Koizumi left the office of Prime Minister in Japan in 2006 (The New York 
Times, 19/9/2010). In the international media, the incident was interpreted as a victory for China 
and a defeat for Japan; China’s aggressiveness and Japan’s weakness were depicted as reflecting 
the rise of China as a great power and the decline of Japan. Hagstrom called this dominant media 





China emerging (Hagstrom 2012).  
 
5.5.2 The production of the 2010 boat collision incident in China: the incident 
was ‘what China made of it’ 
Regardless of whether China’s response to the 2010 boat collision incident could be interpreted 
as strength or weakness, we need to ask first why China reacted in such a particular way. Why 
did Chinese officials consider Japanese actions in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands area as such a 
serious threat to China? I will go on to argue that rather than a rational response to a pre-given 
condition, Chinese policy towards the islands is constructed in relation to China's identity. Rather 
than an objective fact, the 2010 boat collision incident was understood and actively produced as a 
threat to China and Japanese actions were understood as aggressive intentions. China’s responses 
and policies would have been different if China had different identities towards Japan. Perhaps 
then China would have interpreted the incident as just a misunderstanding, with no specific 
Japanese agenda behind.  
 
The 2010 boat collision incident was forged by state officials in China to produce and reproduce 
China’s ‘victimized’ identity. Powerful historical analogies of Japan oppressing and humiliating 
China were activated during the engagement with Japan. The 2010 boat collision incident 
activated the identity of China as a victim of Japan and therefore elicited a strong reaction in 
China, which enabled China to re-establish moral authority against Japan and emphasize Japan’s 
continued intentions to humiliate China. The identity of China as a victim of Japan therefore gave 
China moral credentials and the resolute stance against aggressive Japan were enabled by a 
particular Chinese identity. 
 
Nevertheless, the 2010 boat collision incident was not only a product of a certain identity, the 
incident actively helped to reproduce and secure China’s victimized identity. China’s narrative 
around the incident was constructed to secure China’s identity for the representations of the 
events of the 2010 boat collision incident helped to define it as a dangerous event that required a 
strong response. China’s policy also helped to marginalize any other narratives, such as 
promoting Sino-Japanese friendship or the strength of the Japanese claim, or maybe to obscure 





Therefore, the 2010 boat collision incident enabled China to articulate relations of difference that 
constrained but at the same time secured its ‘victimized’ identity. In the case of China the 
securing of the Chinese Self is based on the ‘Othering’ of Japan. The difference in Japan, such as 
the different view on the sovereignty of the islands, was transformed into a threat to China. 
Therefore events such as the 2010 diplomatic incident presented opportunities to reinstate 
China’s and Japan’s identities. What follows is a constructivist analysis of the 2010 boat collision 
incident. This following part of this chapter applies Banchoff’s framework (1999) for foreign 
policy analysis to account for China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, and the 
response to the 2010 boat collision incident. The framework links China’s identity and its foreign 




Figure 5: The effects of China’s ‘victimized’ identity on its response and the handling of the 
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According to Banchoff’s framework to demonstrate the effect of identity on foreign policy, first, 
the contents of state identity must be pinpointed and their effect on state action must be 
subsequently established. The first part will therefore, specify the relationship between China’s 
‘victimized identity’ and the 2010 boat collision incident. Secondly, the effects of the victim 






 step: China’s ‘victimized’ identity 
Chapter 4 mapped the emergence of the victimized identity of China as a product of an identity 
crisis China was embroiled in after 1989. As a consequence, China redefined its relationship with 
other countries, particularly Japan. While before Japan was an example that China was striving to 
emulate, in the post-1989 climate China was increasingly imagined as a victim of the foreign 
countries, which constantly strive to harm and humiliate China. Japan played a particularly 
prominent role in this construction as the ‘Other’ against which China’s identity is defined.  
 
Given the developments in Sino-Japanese relations, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands became firmly 
embedded in the discursive construction of China’s victimized identity.  
The 1992 Law on Territorial Sea specified that Diaoyu islands are an inherent part of China. This 
was the first time that a Chinese law stipulated Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a part of China. 
Moreover, Chinese leaders tended to emphasize the link between the islands and Chinese 
mainland by referring to Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as China’s “inherent territory” or “sacred 
territory” (People's Daily, 12/10/2010). These discursive constructions therefore construct a 
strong link between China and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and then can serve as foundations for 
a specific policy.  
 
Analysing Sino-Japanese relations through the lens of China’s ‘victimized’ identity, the current 
situation regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is merely a continuation of Japan’s 
policies intended to harm China. In 2012, after Japan announced its decision to nationalize the 
islands, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Fu Ying commented: “what the Japanese government 
has done over the Diaoyu Islands was like robbing salt into a deep open wound on the heart of 
the Chinese people” [emphasis mine](China Daily, 21/9/2012), which emphasized the Chinese 
perception of continuous Japanese aggression and insult towards China. Parallels and analogies 
as featured in the Chinese media are important in the narrative of victimhood that discursively 
links the current Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute to Sino-Japanese history. Japan’s aggressive 
intentions and China’s rightful defence and resistance are a recurring theme. On 18 September 
2010, on the anniversary of the Mukden incident and a heated period of the dispute, People's 




editorial “Never Forget National Humiliation, Join up for National Renaissance”, which noted the 
invasion of China by foreign powers (Xinhua, 18/9/2011).   
 
The narrative which has been recovered from Chinese media about the 2010 incident underscores 
Japan’s belligerent intentions and absolves China of any blame or fault. Jiang Lifeng, former 
director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, blamed 
the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations following the 2010 incident on “Japan’s reaction to 
the [boat] collision”. He subscribed Japan’s “wrongdoing” to the policies of DPJ and 
conservatism in Japan. In the narrative, China’s patrolling and fishing in the waters adjacent to 
the islands was a legitimate action to protect national sovereignty, while Japan’s “aggressive 
marine policy”and “irrational behaviour” were portrayed as the very root of the problem (China 
Daily, 4/11/2010). Therefore, the discourse on China’s victimhood not only put all the blame on 
Japan, but also legitimises Chinese behaviour, such as dispatching Chinese surveillance ships into 
the waters near the disputed islands, which might be seen as escalating the dispute. This 
sentiment was confirmed one year later in an opinion poll conducted one year after the incident 
took place out that 51 per cent of Chinese believed the Japanese government's tough stance had 
escalated the 2010 boat collision incident (China Daily, 12/8/2011). In 2012, Prime Minister Wen 
echoed this sentiment by saying China would not make any concessions on the Diaoyu/Senkaku 




 step: Effect of China’s ‘victimized ‘identity on Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
policy: China’s response to the 2010 boat collision incident 
Descriptive dimension of identity discourse 
Representations of China’s identity impacted and constrained China’s policy options when 
dealing with Japan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. Likewise, China’s construction of 
the 2010 boat collision incident guided the Chinese decisions and behaviour vis-a-vis Japan in the 
aftermath of the incident. As stemming from the victimized identity, the Chinese narrative around 
the 2010 boat collision incident began with the collision of two vessels, the Chinese fishing boat 
and the Japanese coast guard vessel, and the subsequent detention of the crew. According to 




and described the boarding of the fishing trawler and arrest of the crew by the Japanese coast 
guard as an illegal and unlawful act. In the narrative, Japanese actions were depicted as “absurd, 
illegal and invalid”, “seriously infringed upon China's territorial sovereignty” and “China will 
never accept that” (China Daily, 11/9/2010). A month later the Japanese government released the 
video of the incident (also available on the YouTube), which clearly confirmed that the Chinese 
fishing boat actually rammed into the Japanese coast guard vessel. However, the Chinese official 
account of the events either ignored this, (MOFA, 1/11/2010), or continued to deny any 
responsibility for the maritime collision and in accused Japan back of trying to put the blame on 
China. According to the Ministry spokesperson, Japan "seriously infringed upon China's 
territorial sovereignty and legal rights of the Chinese fishermen. The so-called footage cannot 
change the facts, nor can it cover the illegality of the Japanese move" (China Daily, 2/11/2010).  
 
Such discursive constructions reduced China to the position of an innocent victim of Japan’s 
actions and assigned all the responsibility to Japan. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson described 
the incident flowingly: "the current situation was caused by what Japan has done on the Diaoyu 
Islands, so Japan should completely accountable for it" (Xinhua, 16/9/2010). Moreover, Premier 
Wen subscribed the entire responsibility for current and any future developments to Japan: “If 
Japan acts willfully despite advice to the contrary, China will take further actions, and Japan must 
accept full responsibility for all the severe consequences” (quoted in Hagstrom 2012). Moreover, 
Japan’s motives were questioned; Zhang Zhirong, a professor at Peking University, said the 
incident reflected Japan's lack of respect for human rights and [hostile] "hidden political motives" 
(Xinhua, 20/9/2010). 
 
To take any blame for the events of the incident it would be inconsistent with the victimized 
identity, even though the video of the incident which was leaked and subsequently posted online 
showed that the Chinese ship rammed into the Japanese vessel. Therefore, the victim analogy 
only reinforces the image of Japanese aggression and Japanese intentions as unfriendly to China. 
The actions of Japan were continuously described as illegal, and belligerent which not only 
secured the moral high ground for China, but also prescribed China’s action in order to protect its 




of identity inform the content of interests communicated by national leaders.   
 
Nevertheless, by emphasizing China’s victimhood, the Chinese official discourse excluded other 
experiences. For example, as observers noted, it failed to mention that in the past Chinese vessels 
captured and held Vietnamese fishermen in the waters surrounding the Paracel archipelago, 
which is controlled by China but claimed by both countries (South China Morning Post, 
21/9/2010). In this case, China acted rather like a bully than as an innocent victim and clearly 
held double-standards; nevertheless, this would not be consistent with the self-identity as victim 
and was therefore absent from China’s account of the 2010 incident.  
 
Narrative dimension of identity discourse 
Secondly, description of the 2010 boat collision incident will be corroborated by a narrative 
dimension of identity discourse that puts the current events into a historical perspective. In 
China’s understanding, China has been continuously victimised by Japan and Japan’s intentions 
have always been malignant. According to the China Daily Hong Kong editorial accused Japan of 
constantly “keeping on trying, using dirty measures [towards China and the Diaoyu islands]”, 
nevertheless, as the author added, these will inevitably fail as they “only serve to anger and unite 
all Chinese around the world” (China Daily Hong Kong Edition, 21/9/2010). 
 
Similarly, the official discourse highlighted the continuing hostile intentions of the United States 
towards China who continues to manipulate the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute to split China and Japan. 
Feng Zhaokui, a researcher with the Institute of Japanese Studies under the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, wrote that “Diaoyu Islands dispute was a disruptive mine planted by the United 
States into Sino-Japanese relations nearly four decades ago”. He further lambasted American 
policy and described it as “tactic often employed by imperialists” and held it responsible for the 
deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations and the territorial dispute (China Daily, 15/9/2010). 
 
Therefore, anchoring the 2010 boat collision incident into the victim narrative, Japanese (and 
American) actions of 2010 are a continuation of the aggressive action that started with the First 
Sino-Japanese War. By placing the incident into a wider narrative, the past is discursively linked 




China’s weakness resulted into a profound Chinese humiliation in the past and therefore China 
must resist Japan’s current hostile policies. Chinese officials frequently maintain that "China 
hopes Japan can have a correct view and proper handling of the history” (Xinhua, 16/9/2010). 
Narrative is not merely a story of what happened to the past- but it is likened to the present 
experience and future solutions. It also prescribed China’s action at the moment- China must 
oppose Japan and prevent any future humiliations.  
 
The analysis of China’s political discourse show how the identity as a victim of Japan influenced 
China’s response to the incident. But did the actual behaviour of China prove congruent with the 
victim identity? In order for the identity to have an effect on state behaviour, China’s behaviour 
must be consistent with China’s victimized identity and also the mechanisms that link the two 
must be demonstrated. Or at least according to Banchoff, state behaviour should not contradict 




China’s victim identity influenced a certain course of behaviour and prevented other policy 
options. Therefore, options such as making concessions on the dispute, or appeasing Japan by 
downplaying the incident, or merely interpreting Japan’s action as a mistake with no specific 
agenda behind it were not considered as they would be inconsistent with China’s identity. 
According to an analysis of the international press following the incident, China’s reaction was 
“unprecedented and harsh”, “aggressive”, “very tough” and “fierce and violent” (Hagstrom 2012: 
276-277). Moreover, the popular response to the incident in China in the form of large scale 
demonstrations only confirmed the embeddedness of the victimized identity in China. There were 
large scale protests in China’s major cities, including Chengdu, Xi’an and Zhengzhou and 
included slogans such as “Defend the Diaoyu Islands” and “Fight Japan” (China Daily Hong 
Kong edition, 17/10/2010). In Beijing, dozens of protestors gathered outside the Japanese 
embassy, unfurling banners and shouting "Japan, get out of the Diaoyu Islands," "Boycott 
Japanese goods," "Don't forget national humiliation, don't forget Sept. 18" (Xinhua, 21/9/2010). 




was an attempt by activists to sail to the dispute islands as well as a protest in front of the 
Japanese consulate, which condemned Japan’s actions (The Standard, 14/9/2010). 
 
In the 2010 boat collision incident, therefore, China’s behaviour proved remarkably congruent 
with China’s ‘victimized’ identity. The strong verbal reaction was complemented by continuous 
demands for a Japanese apology and compensation (Xinhua, 25/9/2010). These demands 
persisted even after the fishing trawler crew including the captain were released on September 24. 
China’s push for apology is consistent with its identity as a victim. Japan refused to apologize 
and denied recognition to China’s narrative of the events.  
 
Moreover, as described in the international media, China’s handling of the incident was 
characterized as extremely heavy-handed or even hysterical. This could explain the 
disproportionate diplomatic response, for example, summoning the Japanese Ambassador for at 
least 6 times between September 8 and 19 and requesting Japan to release the arrested captain 
and recognize China’s claim to the islands (Hagstrom 2012: 272). On the bilateral relations level, 
serious damage was caused to diplomatic relations and confidence-building, the planned visit to 
Japan in mid-September of vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress Li Jianguo was called off, citing ‘various reasons’, similarly, Chinese Premier Wen 
refused to meet Prime Minister Kan during a UN development conference in New York on 
September 22. Similarly, China suspended also a host of other bilateral meetings with Japan, such 
as on the East China Sea issue scheduled for mid-September (Shanghai Daily, 11/9/2010). 
According to a Xinhua agency statement of September 21“China has already suspended bilateral 
exchanges at and above the ministerial levels, and halted contact with Japan on the issues of 
increasing civil flights and expanding aviation rights between the two countries” (Xinhua, 
21/9/2012). 
 
Lastly, China’s handling of the incident damaged the bilateral economic relations with Japan. 
China’s second largest trading partner is Japan, only after the United States.47 9% of China’s 
overall trade is with Japan. Japanese firms account for 4% of  
  
                                                             
 
47 China is actually Japan’s number one trading partner.  
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China’s FDI and Japanese businesses in China employ directly one million workers. Moreover, 
China is Japan’s top tourist destination (International Business Times, 19/9/2012). Nevertheless, 
as a consequence of the tensions, Chinese tours to Japan were cancelled. Moreover, the violence 
that became a part of the anti-Japanese demonstrations decreased the confidence of Japanese to 
either visit China or to pursue business relations, due to concerns about security and 
anti-Japanese sentiment.  
 
Moreover, in the midst of the diplomatic spat, China halted the exports of the rare earth minerals 
to Japan. The rare earths are essential for Japan’s high-tech industry and Japan’s economy heavily 
depends on China’s rare earth imports. The exports were halted approximately for two months, 
from September 23 to November 19 (Hagstrom 2012: 274). According to reports from the 
Japanese press, Chinese companies either scrapped the export contracts unilaterally, or merely 
suspended them for fear of punishment from the Chinese authorities (The Associated Press, 
21/10/2013). Undoubtedly, the 2010 boat collision incident had a negative impact on the 
Sino-Japanese economic ties. Nevertheless, China actively sought to escalate the incident and as 
a consequence the harmful impact on economies ties was even more damaging. A similar pattern 
was observed during the 2012 incident, when large Japanese factories in China were forced to be 
closed down. Such an adverse environment might discourage investors and hamper 
Sino-Japanese economic cooperation.  
 
‘Incongruence test’ 
As of now, we have established congruence between China’s victimized identity and response to 
the 2010 boat collision incident. An absence of criticism in China of the government’s handling 
of the incident was noticeable; there were hardly any voices criticizing China’s government 
policy towards Japan. Even though China is not a democratic country and lacks any political 
opposition, policy debates sometimes soak into the public discourse. However, approval can be 
inferred from the large-scale demonstrations that took place in China’s cities; the people in China 
were generally in favour of the government policy and the tough line it took against Japan.  
The incongruence test maintains that if behaviour violates the core of the identity and then the 




other hand, if policies are criticized for their non-conformity to identity and those policies are not 
repeated, then according to Banchoff the effect of identity on state behaviour is strong (Banchoff 
1999: 278-279). While it is difficult to apply the incongruence test to the 2010 boat collision 
incident, it could be applied to the developments in China’s Japan policy. This would demonstrate 
the rootedness of the victimized identity in China and its resistance to change. In early 2000s, a 
group of Chinese scholars suggested closer relationship with Japan based on strategic interests. 
Ma Licheng criticized Chinese popular nationalism for being arrogant and xenophobic and 
likened it to ‘the spirit of the Boxers’ (The Asahi Shimbun, 26/1/2013). Moreover, he called for 
“generosity of a great and victorious nation, and do not need to be excessively harsh with Japan” 
(quoted in Gries 2005:408); this would have likewise affected the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands policy. 
Moreover, other scholars such as Shi Yinhong supported a rapprochement with Japan from the 
perspective of geopolitics highlighting the common strategic interests of China and Japan (Shi 
2003). Gries argued that the ‘new thinking on Japan’ debate failed and the policy suggestions for 
a more conciliatory approach to Japan [the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute] were not successful 
following a huge domestic outcry in China and the death threats against these analysts (Gries 
2005).  
The policy suggestions were criticized and ultimately rejected due to their incompatibility with 
China’s victimized identity towards Japan. And while that debate took place in China ten years 
ago, the implications remain the same for the China’s present-day Japan policy. Closer 
cooperation with Japan and even a pursuit of common rational and material interests was 
rendered impossible, as that would not be compatible with China’s identity. Therefore, even if 
there were strong economic reasons to deescalate the territorial dispute, as this would go against 
the identity China has adopted, it is therefore unlikely to take place.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
China’s post-1989 identity crisis has manifested itself in China’s relations with Japan, in 
particular relating to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. China’s Diaoyu/Senkaku islands policy 
as demonstrated by the 2010 boat collision incident is more complex than just the pursuit of 
material interests, and points to the importance of the ‘victimized’ identity for China’s 




Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute cannot be reduced to a scramble over a few uninhabited islands, 
or the resources contained in the surrounding waters. The economic or the strategic values of the 
islands are insufficient to convincingly account for China’s policy or the response to the 2010 
incident. Rather, the dispute pertains to the unhealed wounds of Sino-Japanese history, from a 
lack of Japan’s full apology for the misdeeds done to China (Matthews 2003). The sentimental 
value of the islands has increased dramatically and they became firmly embedded in the 
victimisation narrative in China. China’s tough stance and hostility towards Japan is congruent 
with its identity as a victimized state, where Japan is the main victimizer. As a constant victim of 
Japan’s real or perceived aggression, China must resist Japanese policies towards the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands; as opposed to protecting its national interests, China is protecting its 
dignity. Humiliation is an insult to the dignity and self-respect of the victim and Chinese policies 
have strived to restore its dignity and wash away the national humiliation.  
 
The analytical framework of Banchoff (1999) logically captured the relationship between China’s 
victimized identity and the Diaoyu islands policy. The close fit between China’s identity, the 
communication and implementation of policies of resistance and opposition to Japan’s actions 
towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands support a constructivist account of China’s foreign policy.  
The descriptive and narrative dimensions of China’s identity continue to inform China’s 
understanding of the Sino-Japanese relations and the territorial dispute. Moreover, China’s 
policies towards Japan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are congruent with China’s identity and 
any domestic attempts to adjust the policy towards Japan were quickly silenced.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis put forward a theoretical explanation of Chinese foreign policy towards the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the post-Cold War era. It utilized a constructivist identity-based 
perspective on international relations arguing that China’s policies towards the islands can be 
understood as stemming from China’s ‘victimized’ identity. The discipline of International 
Relations has struggled to account for China’s policy towards Japan and the disputed islands and 
the identity-based approach provides an alternative explanation. In this chapter, I begin with a 
brief summary of the thesis chapters and the outline of the main arguments. After pointing to the 
limitations of this research, I will discuss its broader implications for constructivist international 
relations research and territorial dispute literature. I will conclude by suggesting ways for 
Sino-Japanese reconciliation based on the identity change and describe the process on the issue 
of Japan’s apology to China.  
 
6.1 Thesis summaries 
6.1.1 Chapters summary 
Chapter 2 firstly explored various approaches to international relations and discussed in detail the 
identity perspective to international relations. The discussion emphasized the importance of 
difference in the process of state identity formation and the impact of identity on a country’s 
foreign policy. Chapter 3 documented the important historical events that continue to frame 
China’s understandings of Japan nowadays. Chapter 4 explored the evolution of Chinese identity 
after 1989. With the withering of the socialist identity and an imminent identity crisis, China’s 
identity started to become more exclusive, and began to emphasize difference as its new 
constitutive dimension. The West and particularly Japan became the ‘Others’ against which the 
‘victimized’ identity became defined. The patriotic education as well as public monuments in 
China became the locus of this particular mode of identity construction. Chapter 5 extended the 
argument from chapter 4 to the international realm, particularly to China’s relations with Japan 
and policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. The chapter argued that the symbolic 
value of the islands increased following the Cold War and now occupies an important place in 




and perceived aggressive actions only help to reinforce the role of Other Japan plays in China’s 
identity construction. China’s ‘harsh’ response to the 2010 boat collision incident and its 
unyielding position demonstrate the salience the identity has in China’s foreign policy formation. 
  
6.1.2 Main arguments summary: Research questions revisited 
This thesis championed an identity-based explanation of foreign policy. As opposed to material 
interests, such as military power or trade, identity as a variable, anchored in constructivist 
ontology and epistemology, focuses on a state’s subjectivity. States are fundamentally social 
actors whose behaviour cannot be reduced to interest maximization. Moreover, reality does not 
present itself to states unproblematically, but is rather filtered through specific historical and 
social experiences. Therefore, a foreign policy is not a result of ahistorical interest calculation, 
but rather stems from and must be consistent with a particular conception of state identity.  
 
The following paragraphs will revisit the research questions stipulated in the Introduction. Most 
importantly, this thesis proposed that in the post-Cold War period, China’s policy towards Japan 
and particularly the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands stem from its ‘victimized’ identity vis-a-vis Japan. 
As a result of an identity crisis, since 1989, Japan became the ‘Other’ in China’s identity 
construction, in other words, China’s identity was defined against Japan by emphasizing 
difference and negativity. The painful memories of the Century of Humiliation provided the 
epistemic foundations on which the identity construction took place in post-Cold War Chinese 
society.  
 
The motivations of China’s foreign policy towards Japan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are 
more complex than the pursuit of material interest. Rather, Japan and its actions vis-a-vis the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were presented to China through the lens of history and the humiliations 
suffered at the hands of Japan. Therefore, China’s policy towards the islands is driven by an 
emotional and cognitive need aimed at preventing further humiliations and redress the injustices 
perpetuated by the Japanese in the past. Only by grasping the sentimental value of the islands as a 
part of the Chinese Self and the Japanese Other, which produces affective practices of Othering 




policy towards Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The impact of China’s ‘victimized’ identity was evident 
from China’s heated and uncompromising response to the 2010 boat collision incident.  
 
Finally, while presently Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute have 
deteriorated, there are still ways for China and Japan to mend their relations. This chapter offers 
ways for the two countries to transform their relationship based on identity change.  
 
6.1.3 Caveats and research limitations 
This thesis has had a particularly narrow scope, namely the Chinese policy towards the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands after 1989, with a particular focus on the 2010 boat collision incident. 
The research focused exclusively on the Chinese side of bilateral relations with Japan and even 
though the adopted self/other framework is a dynamic one, the motivations behind Japanese 
policy were not examined. Rather, Japanese actions towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were 
analysed only when essential for the confirmation of a particular construction of China’s identity. 
The limitation of the identity-based approach is that it is harder to make broader generalisations 
for China’s foreign relations, let alone testable hypotheses that could be applied to different cases. 
 
Moreover, despite the main actors in the territorial dispute being China and Japan, this thesis 
neglected the role that Taiwan and particularly the United States play in the dispute. Taiwan also 
claims the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands; nevertheless as its claim overlaps with China it was 
not a topic of investigation. Similarly, United States has been a major player in East Asia since 
the end of the Second World War and any thorough analysis of the region is incomplete without 
grasping its role. The United States certainly plays the role of the ‘Other’ against which China 
defines its identity (Atanassova-Cornelis 2012) and it might impact on China’s foreign policy 
towards the United States regarding various different foreign policy issues not necessarily related 
to Japan. Nevertheless, as the scope of this research endeavour has been China’s policy towards 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the role of United States or any other party was not considered.  
 




individual or small group psychology to nation-states” (Harkavy 2000: 355), substantial 
methodological challenges still linger in utilizing identity in International Relations. This thesis 
has championed the strategy of discourse analysis, with a focus on English language translations 
of official Chinese documents, or secondary sources in English written by Chinese or Western 
scholars. The advantage of this approach is that it can capture the essence of identity in a 
discourse, either in a verbal or written form; a discourse analysis can also travel between the state 
and the individual levels of analysis. The focus on patriotic education and public monuments help 
illustrate how self and other are constructed through the narratives about war in China. 
 
On the other hand, pinpointing identity can be challenging and depends to a large extent on the 
researcher’s interpretation. Moreover, a more genuine and comprehensive picture of China’s 
identity would have undoubtedly emerged had Chinese primary sources been examined. 
Furthermore, by focusing exclusively on the elite level, this thesis effectively ignored different 
voices that shape China’s identity construction. Undoubtedly, different constructions of identity 
would have emerged from the societal level. Similarly, by examining literature at the popular 
level, the resonance of the ‘victimized’ identity in China could have been more convincingly 
demonstrated.  
 
More generally, an identity-based account of foreign policy would never completely satisfy a 
rationalist convinced that interests, such as the pursuit of material wealth and security, are 
determined by the international system and the distribution of power. Given the preference for 
exogenous factors in foreign policy formation, rationalists pay little attention to or ignore 
endogenous factors such as (national) identity. Secondly, state behaviour is prioritized for the 
analysis of international politics; for rationalists ‘talk is cheap’ and therefore inconsequential. 
Political leaders tend to ‘play domestic audiences’ and carefully calculate political decisions in 
the light of political costs. Given the fundamental differences between the rationalist and 
constructivist approaches to international relations at the meta-theoretical level, it would be 
difficult to convince realists of the importance of identity for international relations analysis. 
Rather than doing that this thesis merely offered an alternative reading of Sino-Japanese relations 
and has painted a convincing picture of the relationship between China’s identity and 





6.2 Thesis contributions 
6.2.1 Contribution to International Relations scholarship 
In line with critical constructivists, this thesis emphasizes the role of the Other in the identity 
construction. By employing the self/other framework, this thesis conceptualized Japan as the 
‘Other’ in China’s identity construction. Without grasping Japan and the active role it has played 
in China’s identity construction, it would be impossible to convincingly account for the change 
and nature of China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. By utilizing Rumelili’s (2004) 
and Banchoff’s (1999) analytical frameworks, this analysis demonstrated that the difference 
China discovered in Japan led to practices of ‘Othering’, which not only resulted in China’s 
conflictual identities towards Japan but also actively impacted on China’s policies towards the 
disputed islands. More generally, this research confirmed the constructivist argument that state 
interests must be treated analytically as historically, culturally and politically contingent. 
 
Secondly, the identity perspective provides a sophisticated account of China’s policy towards the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands that combines domestic and international influences. Scholars suggested 
that the domestic politics in China are salient to the understanding of Sino-Japanese relations 
(Cheung 2010) and China’s policies towards Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (Downs and Saunders 1998, 
Deans 2000). This thesis maintained that the developments in the dispute are more than a 
consequence of the manipulation by the government nor merely are they a function of 
state-society relations in China. While undoubtedly the Chinese government tried to use the 
dispute to its advantage, the dynamics of the dispute are much richer than those captured by the 
domestic legitimacy thesis, as Japan continued to play the role as the Other even without 
government involvement (Suzuki 2008: 324).48 
 
6.2.2 Contribution to the literature on territorial disputes 
Finally, this thesis makes a contribution to the voluminous literature on territorial disputes. In IR, 
territorial disputes are usually studied through large samples backed  
  
                                                             
 
48 Another interesting question not explored here is whether China’s policy towards Japan and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands would be the same if China were to be a democracy. The democratic peace 
hypothesis does not work for Japan and Korea who have failed to develop a collective identity. 
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by the rationalist hypothetico-deductive approach which utilizes the same method to analyze all 
territorial disputes. Such an approach led Vasquez and Henehan to conclude that territorial 
disputes were more war prone than disputes over other types of issues (Vasquez and Henehan 
2001).49 While feasible for some case studies, this approach tells little about the nature of a 
specific dispute and is not particularly helpful to the study of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute. 
State responses to territorial disputes are not merely responses to objective facts but rather social 
constructions created (not only) by state officials to reproduce a particular mode of state identity. 
For example, the events of 2010 boat collision incident were simply not apprehended objectively 
by the Chinese and Japanese participants. The events were described by the Chinese government 
as the continuation of the narrative of Japan’s oppression and humiliation of China, which was 
connected to China’s post-Cold War narratives about itself and Japan. The definition of the 
Sino-Japanese relations and China’s subsequent reaction to the 2010 boat collision incident are a 
part of this process of China’s post-Cold War identity construction.  
 
Moreover, because many of the disputed territories such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands have 
intrinsic value to the claimant countries that cannot be readily measured or quantified, 
quantitative approaches that focus on the outcome of disputes also tell us little about the changes 
in state behavior vis-a-vis the territorial dispute (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Rather, according to 
Forsberg, future studies of territorial disputes need to pay attention to the variations of territorial 
discursive practices with a “focus on demonstrating how the constructions have been established 
in particular contexts and how they change” Forsberg (2003: 20). The detailed attention given to 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute, particularly its construction in post-1989 China and its 
impact on China’s policy and Sino-Japanese relations, provides an example of such a research. 
This is not to say that this is the best method to study all territorial disputes, but it does seem 
rather well-suited to study the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, particularly to account for changes in 
China’s policy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.50  
 
  
                                                             
 
49 Interestingly, while, according to the CIA, around half of all of the world’s states are involved in 
territorial disputes, nevertheless, these disputes overwhelmingly do not complicate relations among 
the states. 
50 For a detailed discussion on utilizing quantitative and qualitative methods for the study of territorial 
disputes, see Kimura and Welch (1998).  
97 
 
6.3 Sino-Japanese reconciliation as identity change 
Given the gravity of the territorial dispute and Sino-Japanese relations, this thesis by way of a 
conclusion offers suggestions for Sino-Japanese reconciliation, which could lead to an eventual 
territorial dispute resolution. The goal here is not to sketch a road map of Sino- Japanese 
reconciliation, or to suggest a timetable of specific steps that need to be undertaken, as this was 
done elsewhere (Gurtov 2008).  
 
Rather, I want to put forward the idea of reconciliation as identity change (Kelman 2004). This 
perspective provides a theoretical alternative to conflict resolution that goes beyond the 
interest-based settlement, such as via economic cooperation, which has done little to melt the ice 
between China and Japan. Rather, according to this perspective, “the primary feature of the 
identity change constituting reconciliation is the removal of the negation of the other as the 
central component of one’s own identity” (Kelman 2004: 119). Reconciliation therefore requires 
a degree of ‘negotiation’ of identity where China and Japan would stop seeing each other as 
enemies but rather as partners coexisting with each other and trying to manage differences. In the 
language of Wendt’s structural theory of international relations (1999), China and Japan would 
move from the Hobbesian culture to the Lockean culture, where they would stop seeing each 
other as enemies and interpret every action of the other as belligerent.  
 
While the Chinese and Japanese identities are locked in as conflictual at the moment (Wirth 
2009), reconciliation would therefore require a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity. 
Returning to Rumelili’s framework from chapter 2, only in particular cases is the other perceived 
and represented as a threat to self’s identity (Rumelili 2004). Therefore, the difference in the 
‘other’ can be acknowledged without necessarily interpreting it as a threat to one’s own identity. 
China and Japan have a rich history of interactions and share many parts of their cultures. 
Therefore, while national identities are defined around inherent characteristics, however, that 
does not necessarily have to exclude Japan. While this task is extremely difficult, there are 
abundant micro foundations for a collective identity: China and Japan share many aspects of 
culture and history and have therefore much to build upon to forge a common collective identity. 
 
Secondly, Japan would have to cease its aggressive actions or actions that would be understood 




requires both the support of China and Japan. If Japan recognized the discourses of China’s 
identity, China would feel more ontologically secure and would not have to feel the need to 
re-inscribe its identity. Recognition and adjustment in identities are central to achieve a break 
from the vicious circle in protracted identity conflicts (Strombom 2012). Recognition makes 
identity more secure and lessens the urge of the self to secure its identity by pointing to the 
dangerous ‘other’. After China’s identity adjustment, Japan could not be so easily dehumanized 
and demonized; similarly, any difference would not lead to Othering and a need to safeguard the 
Chinese Self. As Strombom put it, “the goal is not to reach consensus on one identity or one 
grand story, but rather an acceptance towards the other’s identity and history” (Strombom 
2012:4) .The advantage of recognition is that it does not mean agreement; China and Japan could 
keep different interpretations of history or even competing claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. 
Nevertheless, as long as these differences would not be perceived as a threat to China and they 
would not require such a strong and aggressive response.  
 
The following figure captures the process of Sino-Japanese reconciliation as identity change. It is 
adapted from the original figure from chapter 2 which discussed the role of ‘other’ in the ‘self’s’ 
identity formation. As chapter 4 demonstrated, in post- 1989 China, Japan became the other in 
identity formation. China’s new identity became based on the difference and Japan’s active 
resistance to this identity construction only reinforced its role as the oppressing and dangerous 
Other. Nevertheless, identity constructions can go both ways and the ‘Othering’ of Japan can be 
reversed. As this section outlined, the processes of ‘Othering’ can be reversed. This process will 
undoubtedly be neither easy nor straightforward; nevertheless it provides a sketch for eventual 
Sino- Japanese reconciliation. This reconciliation is based neither on the military balance of 
power, nor the economic independence but would result from a collective identity between China 
and Japan. Such reconciliation would have a decidedly stabilizing impact not only for 
Sino-Japanese relations for also for the entire East Asian region and the world. 
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Figure 6: Sino-Japanese reconciliation as identity change: collective identity as a means for conflict transformation51 
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6.3.1 Issue of Japan’s apology 
A salient step in the relaxation of China’s identity would be Japan’s assurance that Japan not 
only does not have aggressive intentions towards China, but is also fully aware of the 
suffering Japan inflicted on China in the past. In other words, an unambiguous and 
comprehensive apology by Japan could serve as an important fuel of Sino-Japanese 
reconciliation. In the realm of foreign policy, an apology could viably act as a non-military 
security policy that could facilitate the transformation of relations between China and Japan 
(Suzuki 2008). China’s victimized identity and the negative role Japan plays in China’s 
identity construction have become a security issue in China. An apology from Japan could 
help to ‘desecuritize’ the issue and make the identity of China less exclusive and 
oppositional. The identity adjustment would render Japan less threatening in China’s eyes, 
which would make China’s identity more stable and secure. Most importantly, as China’s 
ontological security would be increased, it would lessen China’s urge to reaffirm its identity, 
for example vis-a-vis Diaoyu/Senkaku islands policies. Suzuki outlined a 3-step framework 
of how a Japanese apology could be transformed into a security policy and impact on 
Sino-Japanese relations. Firstly, the apology must be seen as reflecting the will of entire 
Japan. Japan’s identity must become more inclusive; the suffering of the victims of Japan’s 
aggression must become a part of Japan’s identity. Secondly, education in Japan must include 
the restitution of the past wrongs suffered by the victims. Thirdly, an apology should further 
facilitate joint historical research, which provides a vehicle to share historical narratives and 
mediate national identities. An apology by Japan might help transform the identity of China 
as a victim of Japan. As Suzuki put it: “apology helps us tell a new story that could have 
transformative effects on “victims” of war and lead them to shake up the shackles of the past.” 
(Suzuki 2008: 330).  
 
Undoubtedly, practical difficulties surrounding the issue of apology do linger. Too much 
emphasis on apologies could create a domestic backlash in politics and society (Lind 2010). 
Moreover, an apology must be performed at the right time and right place. There is not a 
recipe for a successful apology; apologies are not objective statements and ultimately the 
acceptance of an apology depends on the victim’s evaluation of contrition (Lind 2009: 523). 










that any apology should at least contain admission and remorse. The official apologies of 
Japan’s government often faced opposition from the Diet or took place only after 
international pressure, which could account for a lack of Chinese acceptance and demand for 
a more comprehensive and sincere apology. Undoubtedly, Japan’s unwillingness to fully 
come to terms with the past prevents a more comprehensive reconciliation between China 
and Japan. 
 
Nevertheless, the recent apology in January 2013 of former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama provided an example of how Sino-Japanese reconciliation could look like. The 
apology for Japan’s war crimes at the symbolic location of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial 
Hall is a valuable symbolic gesture as it has the potential to prove to the Chinese people that 
Japanese people are fully aware and sorry about the wartime misdeeds.  
 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is a real political issue that has not only caused 
international instability, but could even lead to a military conflict between China and Japan. 
An Australian professor writing in December 2012 admitted publicly and openly that war 
could very well be a likely outcome of the current dispute (The Sydney Morning Herald, 
26/12/2012). Therefore, creative visions for the mending of the Sino-Japanese relations are 
urgently needed. While divisive and exclusionist national histories are likely to cause 
international antagonism, then a joint history textbook could begin the process of collective 
identification and identity renegotiation. While the joint history textbook project between 
China, Japan and South Korea has been stalled and so far yielded little, they still have a 
tremendous potential for healing of historical wounds and leading the way to reconciliation. 
The increasing collaboration of the Chinese academics with their colleagues from Japan 
could help create an epistemic community that could help transform and moderate the 
foreign policies in both China and Japan.  
 
6.4 The endurance of China's victim identity  
A Financial Times commentary on 23 March 2013 observed that Western countries tend to 
worry that an overconfident China would destabilize international relations and precipitate 
international conflict. Nevertheless, the author also astutely observed that actually a of 










dangerous than a hubristic China is one that feels cornered and threatened and which views 
aggressive actions on its part as justifiable” (Financial Times, 23/3/2012). As this research 
demonstrated, nowhere else is this lack of China’s self-confidence anchored in its victim 
identity more pronounced than in its relations with Japan.  
 
While clinging to negative and painful memories is one way for the Chinese people to 
express connection to their Chinese heritage, there are dangers of reducing one’s identity to 
victimhood. Buruma called this tendency the ‘pseudoreligion of victimhood’ and warned of 
the potentially disastrous consequences for China and the world. He maintained that “it 
becomes questionable when a cultural, ethnic, religious or national community bases its 
communal identity almost entirely on the sentimental solidarity of remembered victimhood, 
“ For that way lies historical myopia and, in extreme circumstances, even vendetta” (Buruma 
1999: 3). Similarly, Japanese intellectual Haruki Murakami, in an opinion piece in Asahi 
Shimbun after the 2012 incident, was critical of the “hysteria” that surrounds the territorial 
dispute. He likened the present sentiments in both countries that surround the dispute to 
“cheap alcohol”, which makes countries speak loudly and boldly but leaves them only with a 
hangover the next morning (The Guardian, 1/10/2012). 
 
Notwithstanding the prominence of the victim identity, , what will be the future 
of China's national identity ? Is the victim identity likely to become a long-term 
phenomenon ? Likewise, if the 'China threat' perception strengthens around the 
world, how will China's victim identity evolve ? According to the analytical 
'Self-Other' framework, identity of the Self is closely linked to the perceptions 
and behaviour of the Other. Therefore, if the "China-threat" perceptions 
strengthens in the West, particularly the United States, China's natural defensive 
reaction would to further embrace its victim identity, which would become even 
more exclusive, emphasizing the oppressive nature of the West and reducing 
options for reconciliation. 
 
While the prominence of victim identity during historical periods varied, it has 
never completely withered, so therefore it is unlikely to go away any time soon. 
Similarly, China's victim identity does not apply to all aspects of China's foreign 
policy, it becomes activated only during specific circumstances. If other countries 
show sensitivity and understanding of China's historical experience, that could in 









is stabilized in domestic discourse in China; therefore, if the discourse changed, 
then the identity itself would be weakened. State leaders in China have almost a 
monopoly on the state discourse, which gives them often more agency than the 
leaders in democratic countries have, and which could be utilized to renegotiate 
China's identity and make it more inclusive.  
 
The current generation of Chinese leadership do not have personal experience of 
the Sino-Japanese War and therefore have not directly suffered from Japanese 
atrocities. Jiang Zemin's personal experiences of war have reportedly impacted 
his behaviour, such as the insistence on apology during his visit of Japan in 1998, 
which effectively marred the summit. The new generation of leadership should 
not be encumbered by these negative memories, and this therefore should not 
impact Sino-Japanese relations negatively. On the other hand, the present leaders 
have been most likely socialised in the memories and beliefs of China's 
victimhood either in family or society. Nevertheless, as President Xi consolidated 
his power only this year, it is too early to tell strongly are the current Chinese 
leaders impacted by the victim identity.  
 
There are ways that could increase China’s self-confidence without necessarily harming or 
ostracizing other countries. Events such as the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing came with 
the potential to reassure China and the Chinese people of China’s prominent place in the 
world and demonstrate the obsolescence of the ‘inferiority complex’. A senior Chinese 
commentator urged that following the Olympic Games the ‘baggage of history’ be dropped 
in China. He argued that “the glow of the Games should have dispelled any lingering 
bitterness arising from the humiliating defeats China suffered in the hands of imperialist 
aggressors in the past century“(China Daily, 2/9/2008). Moreover, he urged that the newly 
gained self-confidence can used in guiding China’s relations with the world.  
Unfortunately, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is a prime of example of national 
insecurities being manifested in China’s foreign relations. Until both China and Japan decide 
to re-examine their identities and make them more inclusive, Sino-Japanese reconciliation or 
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